



THE FAILURE OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS 
DAVID HAUSMAN† 
Within the same immigration court, some immigration judges are up to three 
times more likely than their colleagues to order immigrants deported. Theories of 
appeal and of administrative adjudication imply that appeals processes should 
increase consistency. This Article uses an internal administrative database, obtained 
by Freedom of Information Act request, to demonstrate that the appeals process for 
the immigration courts—a system of administrative adjudication that makes as many 
decisions as the federal courts—does not promote uniformity. The removal orders of 
harsher immigration judges are no more likely to be reversed on appeal by the Board 
of Immigration Appeals or federal courts of appeals. 
Why? I find that the Board of Immigration Appeals and the courts of appeals fail to 
promote uniformity across immigration judges because they review an unrepresentative 
sample of cases. Harsher immigration judges more often order immigrants deported early 
in their proceedings, before they have found a lawyer or filed an application for relief. 
Immigrants without lawyers rarely appeal. The Board therefore rarely reviews the 
removal orders of immigrants who might have meritorious claims but who are assigned 
harsh judges and lack lawyers at the beginning of their proceedings. 
These quantitative findings, together with interviews and immigration court 
observation, lead to three incremental, practical policy recommendations. First, the Board 
of Immigration Appeals and the courts of appeals should adopt a less deferential standard 
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of review of an immigration judge’s denial of a request for a continuance to seek 
representation. Second, the government should take simple steps to make applications for 
relief easier to fill out. Third, the Board of Immigration Appeals should hear a random 
sample of cases in addition to those appealed by the litigants. More broadly, these findings 
offer further reason—in addition to basic access-to-justice concerns—to support calls for 
the government to appoint counsel for immigrants in removal proceedings. 
 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 1178 
I. UNIFORMITY AND THEORIES OF ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL ..... 1181 
II. MEASURING DISPARITY .......................................................... 1186 
A. Data ........................................................................................ 1189 
B. Measuring Harshness ................................................................. 1190 
III. APPEALS .................................................................................. 1191 
A. The Board of Immigration Appeals ............................................... 1192 
B. Courts of Appeals ......................................................................... 1196 
IV. TIME, LAWYERS, AND SELECTION BIAS IN APPEALS ................. 1197 
A. Time, Encouragement, and Access to Counsel and Relief ................. 1198 
1. Providing Time to Access Counsel .................................... 1198 
2. Influencing Immigrants’ Litigation Strategy ...................... 1201 
B. Selection Effects on Appeal .......................................................... 1203 
C. 2002 Streamlining at the Board of Immigration Appeals ................. 1205 
V. IMPLICATIONS ........................................................................ 1207 
A. Immigration Adjudications ......................................................... 1208 
1. Review of Denials of Continuances ................................... 1208 
2. Practical Changes to Application for Relief Process ........... 1209 
3. Review of Additional Cases ................................................ 1211 
4. Adoption of Government-Provided Counsel  
for Immigrants .................................................................. 1212 
B. Administrative Due Process .........................................................1214 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................. 1216 
APPENDIX ...................................................................................... 1218 
A. Case Assignment ....................................................................... 1218 
B. Subsample ................................................................................ 1225 
C. Appeals Regressions .................................................................... 1227 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In some immigration courts, the arbitrary assignment of a judge can 
increase or decrease an immigrant’s chance of being deported by up to forty 
percentage points. These disparities are large not only in absolute terms, but 
also relative to other well-known judicial disparities. For example, disparities 
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in rates of deportation are three times larger, on average, than disparities in 
federal judges’ decisions about whether to incarcerate criminals.1 
Immigrants2 who are ordered deported by a particularly harsh judge may 
appeal that judgment to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), and from 
there to a federal court of appeals.3 One might expect this appeals process to 
counteract disparities across immigration judges. Does it? If not, why not? 
To answer these questions, I use a database, obtained by Freedom of 
Information Act request, that includes records of every immigration court 
proceeding initiated over the last two decades.4 The database contains 
information about immigrants’ nationalities and lawyers, the location of their 
immigration proceedings, the immigration charges against them, and the 
applications for relief that they filed. It also tracks success on appeal. The 
long timespan covered by the data allows cases to be traced from beginning 
to end, even when a case lasts over ten years, as some do. 
The data reveal that the BIA is, surprisingly, not more likely to reverse the 
removal orders of relatively harsher judges (immigration judges who deport 
more immigrants than their court’s average). I argue that this pattern (or lack of 
one) reflects the fact that judges who hesitate to issue removal orders also allow 
immigrants far more time to find a lawyer. Some judges allow cases to last up to 
two years longer, on average, than cases before other judges in the same court. 
Immigrants who appear before these generous judges are therefore more likely 
to have a lawyer by the time their case is decided. Because immigrants with a 
lawyer are far more likely to appeal, cases decided by generous judges are thus 
more often reviewed and reversed. 
These findings advance the empirical literature on immigration courts 
and administrative review. First, the new and comprehensive data set makes it 
possible to track, for the first time, disparities across judges for all cases across 
three levels of adjudication—immigration courts, the BIA, and courts of 
appeals. Second, in measuring cross-judge disparities, I consider and account 
for the lack of pure random assignment of cases to judges. Third, previous 
empirical scholarship on immigration courts has focused on the subset of 
 
1  See Crystal S. Yang, Have Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparities Increased in an Advisory Guidelines 
Regime? Evidence from Booker 32 (Coase–Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 662, 
2014) (finding that the maximum standard deviation of judges’ incarceration rates over all periods 
under study was 2.7 percentage points). 
2 For simplicity, I refer to respondents in immigration court as “immigrants,” even though 
some such respondents entered the country on nonimmigrant visas. 
3 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) (2012) (“[A] petition for review filed with an appropriate court of 
appeals in accordance with this section shall be the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of an 
order of removal . . . .”); Martinez v. Napolitano, 704 F.3d 620, 621-22 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that 
under § 1252(a)(5), after an immigration judge orders removal and the BIA affirms, the exclusive way 
to challenge removal is to petition the appropriate court of appeals). 
4 The data set includes just under five million cases. 
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cases in which an immigrant applies for asylum;5 I show that the random 
assignment of an immigration judge affects not only case outcomes, but also 
whether an immigrant applies for asylum or other relief in the first place. 
Finally, this Article uses detailed date information from the administrative data 
set, together with court observation and interviews, to offer a novel explanation 
for the immigration appeals process’s failure to increase consistency in 
immigration judge decisions. 
More broadly, these findings should influence theoretical scholarship on 
the effectiveness of administrative and judicial appeals. They highlight the 
mismatch between the (minimal) inquisitorial procedures available for 
immigrants without lawyers in immigration court and the adversarial system 
of immigration appeals, which requires immigrants to initiate a written 
appeal without guidance from the immigration judge. The result of this 
mismatch is that immigrants without lawyers almost never appeal. Appellate 
judges therefore hear an unrepresentative sample of cases and are unable to 
review immigration judges’ decisions effectively. The problem of selection 
bias in appeals is a general one that matters in other types of adjudications as 
well: whenever some litigants are more likely than others to appeal cases of 
similar merit, appellate judges hear an unrepresentative sample of cases. I 
therefore conclude by calling for further research along similar lines in other 
areas of administrative adjudications. 
In sum, this Article brings data to the question of when appeals courts can 
promote uniformity across inferior court judges. The immigration appeals 
system fails to do so because judges not only decide whether to order 
immigrants deported but also influence whether immigrants choose to appeal. 
Part I describes normative theories of appeal and their implication that 
appeals should promote uniformity across inferior courts’ judges. Part II 
introduces a measure of disparities across immigration judges. Disparities in 
immigration judges’ removal decisions are more than three times larger than 
disparities in federal judges’ decisions about whether to send a convicted criminal 
to prison.6 Part III shows that the BIA and the federal courts of appeals do little 
to counteract these disparities: neither the BIA nor the circuit courts are more 
likely to reverse the decisions of harsher judges when immigrants appeal. By 
contrast, when the government appeals—which it does more than ten times less 
frequently than immigrants—the BIA more often reverses the decisions of 
generous judges than those of harsher judges. Part IV explains these findings by 
matching disparities in final relief rates with disparities in case length, as well as 
disparities in the likelihood that an immigrant has a lawyer. Generous judges are 
more likely to let cases last longer, and the immigrants appearing before them 
 
5 See, e.g., infra note 37 and accompanying text. 
6 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
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are therefore more likely to find lawyers and—crucially—to appeal and win on 
appeal. Part V, finally, draws out the implications of these findings. The 
Department of Justice could reduce disparities by facilitating applications for 
relief, providing lawyers to immigrants, and requiring the BIA to review a 
random sample of cases sua sponte. The courts of appeals could contribute by 
altering the standard of review for appeals from denials of continuances. Most 
broadly, these findings offer another reason to think critically about the 
implications of selection bias on appeal. 
I. UNIFORMITY AND THEORIES OF ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL 
Uniformity is both a goal of appeals processes and an indication that they 
are functioning properly. The two core rationales for the availability of 
appeals—error correction and lawmaking7—require appeals courts to increase 
consistency in legal decisions. Normative models of administrative justice 
carry the same implication for intermediate agency review and, more weakly, 
for judicial review of administrative adjudications. Together, these theories 
suggest that appeals processes should make the decisions of inferior court 
judges more uniform. The failure of immigration appeals to do so is troubling. 
Why make appeals available at all? First, an appeals court may detect 
errors made by a trial court. Steven Shavell famously argued that an appeals 
process may improve error detection by using litigants’ knowledge about the 
accuracy of a judicial proceeding: when litigants believe that the outcome of 
a proceeding is wrong, they are more likely to expend the cost of appeal, since 
they think they will win.8 An error here means anything that would lead to 
the reversal of the original decision, including a decision not in line with 
appeals courts’ policy preferences. Lewis Kornhauser, for example, built an 
influential theory of the benefits of judicial hierarchy on the notion that appeals 
may help a court system reach correct outcomes, where correctness is explicitly 
defined as uniformity.9 Others have described uniformity as a normatively 
neutral measure of correctness and as a central element of the rule of law.10 
 
7 See Chad M. Oldfather, Error Correction, 85 IND. L.J. 49, 49 (2010) (“Most depictions of 
appellate courts suggest that they serve two core functions: the creation and refinement of law and 
the correction of error.”). 
8 See Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 379, 
387 (1995) (“When the appeals process is optimally employed, disappointed litigants who were the 
victims of error bring appeals, and those who were not do not bring appeals.”). 
9 See Lewis A. Kornhauser, Adjudication by a Resource-Constrained Team: Hierarchy and Precedent in a 
Judicial System, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1605, 1628 (1995) (positing that no matter how one conceives the 
appellate system’s function, promoting uniformity is either the express purpose or a necessary result). 
10 See, e.g., Oldfather, supra note 7, at 60-61 (arguing that “uniformity seemingly invokes . . . the 
idea that like cases should be treated alike, and . . . those who are similarly situated ought to be 
treated similarly” and concluding that appellate courts’ role is to ensure consistency across judges 
within the same jurisdiction); Jeremy Waldron, Lucky in Your Judge, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 
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At a minimum, whether an appeals process produces more uniform 
outcomes is an indicator of whether it successfully corrects errors. In the 
immigration court system, the lack of greater uniformity after appeals suggests 
that the BIA and the courts of appeals are not successfully correcting errors. 
Of course, appeals courts do not only correct errors; they also make law 
by precedent. Yet lawmaking, too, should increase uniformity in lower court 
outcomes: by elaborating rules that lower court judges must follow, appeals 
courts reduce the discretion of those judges and promote uniformity across 
their decisions. Scholars have debated both to what degree a hierarchical 
system that establishes precedent is desirable11 and whether the federal 
judiciary actually functions in this way.12 All agree, however, that when 
appellate courts elaborate on legal rules, they should guide lower courts, at 
least to some degree, and lead to greater uniformity.13 
The BIA performs this lawmaking function within the Executive Office 
for Immigration Review (EOIR) by publishing select opinions and, in 
unpublished opinions, by reviewing immigration judges’ decisions for their 
compliance with the BIA’s published decisions. If the BIA successfully sets 
and enforces policy, its review of immigration judges’ decisions should reduce 
inconsistency by bringing the decisions in line with the policy the BIA has 
set. No matter whether immigration appeals exist to set policy or to correct 
errors, they should promote uniformity across immigration judges’ decisions. 
Just as theories of appeal imply that a legal hierarchy should promote 
uniformity, so too do theories of administrative adjudication imply that 
agency appeals bodies should make outcomes more uniform. In a seminal 
article, Jerry Mashaw set out three competing models of administrative 
justice.14 Uniformity in outcomes is an important goal of administrative 
 
185, 192-93 (2007) (noting that uniformity is a central element of the rule of law while acknowledging 
that inconsistency in application of the law due to luck cannot be eliminated from a court system). 
11 Compare Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior 
Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 16 (1994) (“The lower courts are merely intended to 
facilitate universal access to the Court’s edicts.”), and Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts 
Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 828-55 (1994) (noting that while arguments 
in favor of using judicial hierarchy to create uniformity across lower courts are almost “universally” 
accepted, they are based on several different rationales), with Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 
82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 442 (2007) (arguing that because legal rules may sometimes be indeterminate 
and social needs require flexibility in the application of legal rules, lower courts do not always need 
to be bound by appellate court pronouncements). 
12 See Donald R. Songer et al., The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal–Agent Model of 
Supreme Court–Circuit Court Interactions, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 673, 681-90 (1994) (reviewing a set of 
circuit court search and seizure cases and determining that the circuit courts often, but not always, 
follow Supreme Court precedent). 
13 See Kim, supra note 11, at 441 (accepting, with reservations, that “economy and  
uniformity . . . are served by obedience to hierarchical precedent”). 
14 Jerry L. Mashaw, Conflict and Compromise Among Models of Administrative Justice, 1981 DUKE L.J. 181. 
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review regardless of which model one accepts. The first model—the one most 
prominent in constitutional due process doctrine—considers error avoidance 
the central purpose of administrative adjudications.15 Mashaw calls this 
model, which ignores the inherent discretion given to adjudicators, the 
“bureaucratic rationality” model.16 He contrasts this prominent model with 
two others: the “professional treatment” and “moral judgment” models.17 The 
professional treatment model compares adjudicators to social workers or 
doctors—professionals whose goal is to treat and help the claimant.18 The 
moral judgment model recognizes that the discretion granted to adjudicators 
requires them to exercise ethical as well as factual judgment.19 
The failure of the BIA to make outcomes more uniform across judges is 
troubling for all three of these models of administrative justice. The 
bureaucratic rationality model requires consistent application of rules to facts 
and hierarchical control of the decisionmaking process;20 large disparities 
across judges, uncorrected by the BIA, undermine that goal. The professional 
treatment model suggests an interpersonal decision structure, but consistency 
of outcomes is no less important; Mashaw contends that a professional 
treatment model can only be successful in the context of highly unified 
professional norms and skills.21 Large disparities in outcomes across judges 
facing similar cases suggest a lack of professional unity. Finally, large 
disparities that are left uncorrected after review are perhaps most disturbing for 
the moral judgment model, which is based on “the neutral application of 
commonly held moral principles.”22 Uniformity in such legal–ethical judgments 
is a central element of the rule of law. 
These theories of appeal and administrative adjudication suggest that 
immigration appeals should make both legal and factual decisions more 
uniform. If some immigration judges consistently make errors—either in favor 
of the government or in favor of immigrants—then appeals to the BIA and 
courts of appeals should increase consistency across judges on both legal and 
factual questions.23 If appeals courts make policy, they should similarly bring 
immigration judges’ legal and factual determinations in line with that policy. 
 
15 Id. at 185. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 186, 188. 
18 Id. at 186. 
19 Id. at 188. 
20 Id. at 185. 
21 Id. at 186-87. 
22 Id. at 189; see also id. at 188 (“[T]he goal of a moral-judgment model of justice . . . [is] 
factually correct applications of previously validated legal norms.”). 
23 Immigration judges make three main types of decisions, all of which should be made more 
uniform by appellate review. First, immigration judges decide whether a respondent is removable. 
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1) (2012). This determination usually raises legal questions, such as whether a 
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Of course, the deference that the BIA and the courts of appeals owe to 
immigration judges constrains their ability to promote uniformity. Although 
normative theories broadly agree that appeals should promote uniformity, the 
responsibility to promote uniformity is more central for within-agency 
appeals bodies than for Article III courts. Scholars and judges continue to 
debate how much deference Article III courts should grant to legal decisions 
and findings of fact in administrative adjudications.24 I do not enter that 
debate, but rather accept the broad consensus, among academics and courts, 
that within-agency appeals bodies should defer less than Article III courts to 
the decisions of administrative judges.25 
The standards of review applied by the BIA and the federal courts of 
appeals in immigration cases reflect this distinction. The BIA reviews 
questions of law de novo and reviews immigration judges’ findings of fact for 
clear error.26 By contrast, courts of appeals must affirm findings of fact that 
are supported by substantial evidence: “[T]he agency’s factual findings are 
‘conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude 
to the contrary.’”27 Moreover, the REAL ID Act of 200528 stripped the circuit 
courts of jurisdiction to review denials of several forms of discretionary 
 
particular state crime fits the federal definition of an aggravated felony. See id. § 1101(a)(43) 
(including within the definition of “aggravated felony” the state crime equivalents of enumerated 
federal offenses). Second, immigration judges decide whether respondents are eligible to apply for 
various forms of relief. Id. § 1229a(c)(4)(A). These decisions, too, raise largely legal questions—for 
example, the commission of an aggravated felony precludes most forms of relief. See, e.g., id. 
§ 1229b(a)(3) (permitting cancellation of removal for respondents only if they have not been 
convicted of an aggravated felony). Finally, immigration judges make discretionary factual 
determinations when deciding whether to grant relief. Id. § 1229a(b)(1). For all of these types of 
decisions, harsher immigration judges are more likely to err on the side of denying relief and 
affirming removability, and more generous immigration judges more likely to err in the opposite 
direction. An appeals system that promotes uniformity should therefore reduce disparities across 
immigration judges both for decisions related to removability and decisions related to relief. 
24 See, e.g., Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Review: “Substantial Evidence on the Whole Record,” 64 HARV. 
L. REV. 1233, 1261 (1951) (reading cases interpreting the standard of review for findings of fact as 
properly establishing an area of administrative discretion); Robert Kramer, The Place and Function of 
Judicial Review in the Administrative Process, 28 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 11 (1959) (endorsing substantial 
judicial deference to administrative action, limiting review to “where its merits clearly outweigh its 
disadvantages”); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Costs and Benefits of Aggressive Judicial Review of Agency 
Action, 1989 DUKE L.J. 522, 536 (emphasizing the difficulty of assessing the strengths and weaknesses 
of robust judicial review of agency action). 
25 See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 24, at 78 (“An agency is not an inferior tribunal or a lower court 
judge, but rather an autonomous body, applying specialized knowledge and experience to regulate 
areas demanding flexibility and complex judgments. Courts cannot and should not be made to 
guarantee the correctness of every agency decision.”). 
26 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i)-(ii) (2015). 
27 Huo Qiang Chen v. Holder, 773 F.3d 396, 403 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). 
28 REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302 (codified in scattered  
sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
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relief29 as well as findings of fact underlying the removal orders of immigrants 
convicted of certain crimes. The courts of appeals retain the authority to 
review legal and constitutional questions,30 but the legal conclusions of the 
BIA are often entitled to deference.31 In other words, courts of appeals are 
more deferential to immigration judges’ decisions than is the BIA with 
respect to both questions of law and questions of fact. One would therefore 
expect the courts of appeals to play a more limited role than the BIA in 
promoting uniformity, but to play a role nonetheless—deference has limits. 
Despite the importance of uniformity, empirical scholarship has only 
indirectly investigated whether appeals courts achieve this goal. Scholars have 
so far focused more on compliance than on uniformity; for instance, a large 
body of work has found that federal appellate court judges usually (but not 
always) comply with Supreme Court decisions.32 Research on the effects of 
court of appeals review of district court patent claim construction has 
generated somewhat more mixed results: district court judges whose claim 
construction decisions have been appealed more often in the past are no more 
likely to avoid reversal in subsequent appeals,33 and, before the establishment 
of the Federal Circuit, the patent policies of district courts and their circuits 
appeared to be only loosely connected.34 More recently, Daniel Ho examined 
 
29 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) (precluding judicial review of denials of discretionary relief, 
including cancellation of removal and voluntary departure); id. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (precluding judicial 
review of the removal orders of immigrants convicted of certain classes of crimes); id. § 1252(a)(4) 
(precluding judicial review of Convention Against Torture claims). But see id. § 1252(a)(2)(D) 
(providing that these jurisdiction-stripping provisions do not preclude review of constitutional 
questions or questions of law on petition for review). 
30 See Hamid v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 642, 647 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that the REAL ID Act 
provides for review of constitutional questions and questions of law in some cases where judicial 
review would be otherwise precluded); David M. McConnell, Judicial Review Under the Immigration 
and Nationality Act: Habeas Corpus and the Coming of REAL ID (1996–2005), 51 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 
75, 108 n.177 (2006–07) (listing cases in which courts of appeals dismissed appeals arising from the 
BIA for lack of jurisdiction due to the REAL ID Act). 
31 See Baraket v. Holder, 632 F.3d 56, 58 (2d Cir. 2011) (noting that the Second Circuit applies 
Chevron deference to the BIA’s interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act in published, 
precedential opinions); cf. Esparza-Rodriguez v. Holder, 699 F.3d 821, 823-24 (5th Cir. 2012) (“We 
give Chevron deference to the BIA’s interpretation of the term ‘moral turpitude’ and its guidance on 
the general categories of offenses which constitute [crimes involving moral turpitude], but we review 
de novo the BIA’s determination of whether a particular state or federal crime qualifies as a [crime 
involving moral turpitude].”). 
32 See, e.g., Sara C. Benesh & Malia Reddick, Overruled: An Event History Analysis of Lower Court 
Reaction to Supreme Court Alteration of Precedent, 64 J. POL. 534, 536 (2002) (“[L]ittle evidence of outright 
defiance has been found in the Court of Appeals.”); Donald R. Songer et al., supra note 12, at 681-90 
(finding that although circuit judges sometimes indulge their own preferences, they respond strongly 
to Supreme Court changes in search and seizure policy). 
33 David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal 
Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 225-26 (2008). 
34 See Lawrence Baum, Responses of Federal District Judges to Court of Appeals Policies: An 
Exploration, 33 W. POL. Q. 217, 223 (1980) (concluding that while patent validity decisions were 
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consistency in restaurant food safety scoring over time.35 He compared restaurant 
inspection and reinspection scores in New York City before and after appeals 
hearings and found little evidence that appeals hearings increased consistency.36 
Finally, an important new book examines the role of the BIA in asylum 
decisions and makes important contributions to our understanding of the role 
of the BIA’s ideology.37 Because it limits its sample to asylum decisions, 
however, the book does not address the problem that this Article reveals: the 
BIA cannot effectively review immigration judges’ decisions because 
immigration judges influence whether immigrants find a lawyer and apply for 
asylum or other forms of relief—and whether they eventually appeal. 
The shortage of empirical scholarship on these issues reflects the 
complexity of the problem. Uniformity is difficult to measure and there are 
few large sources of data matching adjudications across levels of review. This 
Article addresses these difficulties with a measure of one aspect of 
uniformity—cross-judge disparity—and a new database that matches all 
immigration court outcomes to appeals. The results are troubling. Immigrants 
whose cases were decided by harsher judges are no more likely to appeal and 
win than immigrants whose cases were heard by more generous judges. 
II. MEASURING DISPARITY 
Immigration judges vary dramatically in their relief rates—the rates at 
which they allow immigrants to remain in the United States. To calculate 
these relief rates, I include not only formal grants of relief—such as grants of 
applications for asylum or cancellation of removal—but also other outcomes 
that allow immigrants to remain in the country.38 An important recent article 
 
significantly related between district courts and their courts of appeals, there was a “substantial gap” 
between the courts in their “decisional tendencies”). 
35 Daniel E. Ho, Fudging the Nudge: Information Disclosure and Restaurant Grading, 122 YALE L.J. 
574 (2012). For qualitative work on the role of the Social Security Appeals Council, a different 
administrative review body, see generally JERRY MASHAW ET AL., SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS 
AND APPEALS: A STUDY OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION HEARING SYSTEM (1978); 
Charles H. Koch, Jr. & David A. Koplow, The Fourth Bite at the Apple: A Study of the Operation and 
Utility of the Social Security Administration’s Appeals Council, 17 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 199, 307-08 (1990) 
(recommending, among other things, that the Appeals Council focus more on policymaking and 
slow its review of administrative law judges’ decisions, allowing it more time to correct errors). 
36 Ho, supra note 35, at 667-70. 
37 See BANKS MILLER ET AL., IMMIGRATION JUDGES AND U.S. ASYLUM POLICY 106-49 
(2015) (testing hypotheses about the BIA’s role in error correction and policy formulation using a 
sample of only asylum cases). 
38 The most important of these other outcomes is the termination of a case. Termination occurs 
when the immigration judge concludes that the government did not show by clear and convincing 
evidence that the immigrant is in the country illegally (i.e., that the immigrant is inadmissible or 
deportable). See 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2012) (listing grounds of inadmissibility); id. § 1227 (listing 
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and book quantified and began to explain disparities in asylum grant rates.39 
This Article builds on that work by showing that immigration judges not only 
grant relief at different rates, but also affect immigrants’ decisions about 
whether to apply for relief (such as asylum) in the first place and influence 
immigrants’ decisions about whether to appeal. These disparities in case 
management prevent the BIA from reviewing a representative sample of cases, 
hobbling the appeals process and preventing it from promoting uniformity. 
Disparities across immigration judges are large and highly statistically 
significant: the average standard deviation of judge relief rates within the 
nineteen largest courts between 1998 and 2004 was approximately nine 
percentage points.40 This means that for an average court, approximately one 
third of immigrants have their cases decided by judges either nine percentage 
points harsher or nine percentage points more generous than the court average. 
As shown in Figure 1 below, these disparities are many times larger than 
disparities that would arise purely by chance and are more than three times 
larger than disparities across federal judges in decisions about whether to 
send a criminal defendant to prison. 
Figure 1 shows three distributions: the actual distribution of immigration 
judge relief rates; the actual distribution of federal judge decisions about 
whether or not to send a defendant to prison;41 and a simulated distribution 
of immigration judge decisions in which all judges share the same relief rate 
and the only deviations from the mean are caused by chance.42 Immigration 
court disparities are large in both absolute and relative terms. 
 
 
grounds of deportability). In these cases, the immigrant need not be granted relief to remain in the 
country; instead, the government’s case that she is here illegally is simply terminated. 
39 See generally JAYA RAMJI-NOGALES ET AL., REFUGEE ROULETTE: DISPARITIES IN 
ASYLUM ADJUDICATION AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM (2009) [hereinafter RAMJI-NOGALES ET 
AL. (2009)]; Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. 
L. REV. 295 (2007) [hereinafter Ramji-Nogales et al. (2007)]. 
40 See infra Figure 1. 
41 To make this distribution visually comparable, I used the standard deviation calculated by 
Yang, supra note 1, at 32, and simulated a normal distribution with that standard deviation and a 
mean of zero. Yang suggests that federal judge rates are approximately normally distributed. 
42 For each judge, I simulated a relief rate from a binomial distribution based on her court’s 
mean and the actual number of cases she heard during the study period. 
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Figure 1: Immigration Court Disparities Compared43 
 
Do these disparities reflect real differences across judges? Perhaps judges 
decide similar cases similarly but have different relief rates because they hear 
different types of cases. To address this objection, previous work on 
disparities in immigration court has relied on the immigration courts’ own 
assertion that cases are randomly assigned to judges.44 In the Appendix, I 
show that cases are not in fact randomly assigned—likely because cases arrive 
on dockets in clusters—but that assignment appears arbitrary nonetheless: 
the merits of the cases do not appear to vary systematically from judge to 
judge. To be confident that this is accurate, in the Appendix, I replicate these 
 
43 Estimates of immigration judge relief rates include fixed effects and several controls to 
adjust for differences across immigration courts and caseloads. 
44 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-771, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR 
IMMIGRATION REVIEW: CASELOAD PERFORMANCE REPORTING NEEDS IMPROVEMENT 17 (2006), 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/260/251155.pdf [https://perma.cc/U8RJ-M2FY] (“Within each immigration 
court, newly filed cases are generally assigned to immigration judges through an automated process; 
however, some flexibility exists.”). The Report goes on to explain that the random assignment of 
immigration judges may be modified “to correct inequities that occurred in the number and type of 
cases that were assigned to a judge by the automated system,” as well as to ensure that the same 
immigration judge hears an immigrant’s case if the immigrant previously had a case before that judge. 
Id. Finally, an immigration judge may not be assigned to a case if she already has a heavy caseload. Id. 
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measures of cross-judge disparities for a subset of time periods and courts in 
which assignment appears to have been random.45 
A. Data 
The conclusions of this Article hold for the full database of all nondetained 
immigration proceedings over the last two decades. For the results presented in the 
body of the Article, however, I have restricted the sample to exclude cases decided 
during periods of legal change and cases that were not yet resolved in 2014. 
Data come from a Freedom of Information Act request to the EOIR that 
was honored in March 2014. The database contains records of all immigration 
court adjudications that were initiated between the early 1990s and February 
28, 2014. I concentrate on nondetained cases only—the cases in which 
immigrants were never taken into custody at any point in their proceedings. I 
exclude detained cases because they are scheduled separately and present 
different issues.46 For example, a continuance in a nondetained case simply 
gives the immigrant more time; in a detained case, a continuance lengthens the 
immigrant’s detention, which could encourage her to agree to deportation. 
To construct the sample, I began by narrowing the database to cases in which 
the Notice to Appear was issued between January 1, 1998, and August 31, 2004. 
This was a conservative decision made for two reasons. First, some cases take up 
to ten years to resolve. I therefore chose a subset of cases for which all appeals 
had been exhausted for the overwhelming majority of cases. Second, immigration 
law changed significantly with the passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform 
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,47 which affected cases initiated after 
April 1, 1997.48 I avoided the period of change after its passage by excluding cases 
in which the Order to Show Cause was issued before 1998. 
 
45 See infra Appendix, Section A. 
46 The two types of cases are scheduled separately and, in many courts, different judges are 
assigned to the nondetained and detained calendars. The detained calendar also implicates two 
doctrinally separate but practically connected processes: bond and merits determinations. When an 
immigration judge grants bond, an immigrant’s chances of prevailing on her merits claims may 
increase. For suggestive observational evidence along these lines, see Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven 
Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in Immigration Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 50 fig.14 (2015) 
(reporting that from 2007 to 2012, immigrants who were never detained or were released from 
detention were drastically more successful in their cases than immigrants who were detained). 
Empirically, this makes it difficult to identify a judge’s relief rate, since that rate may depend on the 
judge’s doctrinally separate bond determination. Moreover, granting bond often sends the case to 
the nondetained calendar and therefore to a different judge. A high bond grant rate may therefore 
artificially lower a judge’s relief rate by clearing meritorious cases from her docket. 
47 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.  
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546. 
48 See Jimenez-Angeles v. Ashcroft, 291 F.3d 594, 597 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[I]f an alien’s case is 
commenced after April 1, 1997, it appears to be controlled by the new, permanent provisions of the 
[Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act] . . . .”). 
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From among the nondetained cases between 1998 and 2004, I kept only those 
from the largest nineteen immigration courts. I narrowed the data set further by 
excluding all cases in which an immigrant faced proceedings before more than 
one judge; most of these were cases in which an immigrant was initially detained 
and later released.49 Next, I removed all cases for which the judge was not 
identified, as well as cases heard before judges who heard fewer than 300 cases 
in a single immigration court.50 This final step left a data set of 410,875 cases.51 
Table 1 below shows the number of cases after each successive sample restriction. 
 
Table 1: Sample Restrictions 
 
Sample Restriction Remaining 
Cases 
 
Total Cases 4,880,686 
Cases Heard Before One Immigration Judge Only 





Cases Initiated January 1, 1998–August 31, 2005 496,087 
Cases from 19 Courts with More Than 7000 Cases 425,652 
Cases from Immigration Judges Who Heard at Least  
300 Cases 
410,875 
B. Measuring Harshness 
To measure how much judges differ in their harshness, I start by 
calculating judges’ relief rates—the percentage of cases in which they allow 
an immigrant to remain in the United States. I then calculate the standard 
deviation of those relief rates within courts. When relief rates within the same 
court vary more, the standard deviation is larger. In order to include control 
variables and to generate a confidence interval, I use a random effects model, 
described in detail in Appendix, Section B, infra, that is similar to the model 
used in Yang’s study on sentencing disparities.52 That measure of disparity 
retains the same interpretation as the simpler one: it is equivalent to the 
standard deviation of the relief rates within each court, averaged across all 
 
49 Judge change can also occur if the venue changes, if a case has to be calendared urgently and 
the initial judge’s calendar is full, or if a judge leaves a court. 
50 These were likely judges visiting from another immigration court or judges who began their 
terms shortly before the end of the study period. 
51 For the full sample of nondetained cases that spanned two decades, I kept all nondetained 
cases from judges who heard at least 300 cases. The result is a data set with 1,946,239 observations. 
52 See Yang, supra note 1. 
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nineteen courts, accounting for differences across courts and other control 
variables.53 This standard deviation is nine percentage points, meaning that 
about one third of immigrants had their cases decided by judges whose relief 
rates were at least nine percentage points below or above the court mean.54 In 
a court in which 30% of immigrants obtained relief, this level of disparity meant 
that the luckiest 15% of immigrants, assigned to generous judges, were twice as 
likely to avoid deportation as the unluckiest 15%. One might expect the appeals 
process to temper this inconsistency; Part III shows that it does not. 
III. APPEALS 
Normative theories of administrative appeal imply that the appeals 
process should make immigration judges’ decisions more uniform, either by 
correcting errors or by setting precedent in areas of disagreement.55 After the 
immigration judge makes a final decision ordering an immigrant removed or 
granting relief,56 the case may proceed through two levels of review. First, 
either the government or the immigrant may appeal to the BIA.57 Then, if the 
immigrant loses before the BIA, she may petition for review of the decision 
by a circuit court of appeals.58 I find that neither level of appellate review 
substantially increases uniformity across immigration judges’ decisions.59 
 
53 A measure of disparity should be easy to interpret, and it should include a confidence 
interval. Ramji-Nogales et al., whose important work revealed the extent of disparities in asylum 
adjudication, suggest two different measures of disparity. Their first measure compares judges’ 
asylum grant rate to the national mean. Ramji-Nogales et al. (2007), supra note 39, at 332-33. As they 
acknowledge, that measure does not account for cross-court differences in the application pool. Their 
second measure compares judge relief rates to mean rates within courts: they measure the percentage 
of judges whose grant rates are 50% below or above the mean grant rate. Id. at 333-36. This measure 
usefully takes into account cross-court differences, and it is easy to interpret, but it is sensitive to 
the level of the court mean. For example, in a court with a mean 20% grant rate, the 50% difference 
would correspond to a ten percentage point difference, but in a different court with a 40% grant rate, 
the same 50% difference would correspond to twice the percentage point difference in the first court. 
The standard deviation measure lacks this sensitivity, and the random effects model allows me to 
produce confidence intervals, quantifying the statistical uncertainty in the estimates. 
54 The 95% confidence interval for this standard deviation spans 8.3% to 10.1%. 
55 See supra notes 14–22 and accompanying text. 
56 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(1)(A) (2012). 
57 8 C.F.R. § 1003.38(a) (2015). 
58 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5). The Attorney General can also review BIA decisions but does so 
rarely. See Lindsey R. Vaala, Bias on the Bench: Raising the Bar for U.S. Immigration Judges to Ensure 
Equality for Asylum Seekers, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1011, 1016-17 (2007) (“Although the Attorney 
General possesses the authority to review individual cases after they pass through the Immigration 
Courts and BIA, the Attorney General rarely exercises that power.”). 
59 In this Part, as in the rest of the Article, I report results for the 1998–2004 period, but all of 
the results in this part—the Article’s key empirical contributions—also hold for the whole period of 
the database, from the early 1990s to 2014. I do not report them here because they may be biased by 
the exclusion of some recent cases that have not yet been completed. For example, some cases 
initiated in 2010 may already have led to outcomes, especially if they were heard by harsh judges. If 
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A. The Board of Immigration Appeals 
If the BIA counteracts cross-judge disparities and promotes the uniform 
application of the law, the data on appeals and reversals should display one or 
both of two patterns. First, the BIA should reverse the relief decisions of 
generous judges more often than those of harsh judges, and reverse the 
removal decisions of harsh judges more often than those of generous judges. 
Alternately, or in addition, litigants may anticipate the BIA’s consistency-
enhancing effect. In that case, immigrants should appeal the removal orders 
of harsh judges more often than those of generous judges, and the 
government should appeal the relief grants of generous judges more often 
than those of harsh judges. Most importantly, the overall effect of the appeals 
process—the combined effect of more filings and higher reversal rates—
should be to reduce disparities. 
In fact, however, the overall effects of appeals are asymmetric: the BIA is 
more likely to reverse the decisions of generous judges when the government 
appeals, but is not more likely to reverse the decisions of harsh judges when 
immigrants appeal.60 Of course, the BIA may affect outcomes not only by 
reversing decisions, but also by influencing litigants’ decisions as to whether to 
appeal. A full account of the appeals process therefore requires describing—for 
both immigrants’ and the government’s appeals—the filing decisions of the 
litigants, the outcomes before the BIA, and the combined effect of the two.61 
 
patterns in cases are changing over time, then excluding cases that take longer may bias the results. 
The consistency of the patterns for the smaller and larger data sets, however, should increase 
confidence that these patterns are not spurious. 
60 I categorized an immigrant’s appeal as successful in obtaining reversal if the BIA’s decision is 
described in the database as “Remand,” “Sustain,” “Temporary Protected Status,” or “Termination.” Of 
course, in a subset of the remanded cases the immigrant may eventually be removed; I ignored that 
possibility in order to focus on the BIA’s behavior. In considering appeals, I included only “case appeals,” 
which account for more than 70% of all appeals. I excluded motions submitted to the BIA asking it to 
reopen a case since these motions often reflect changed circumstances rather than an argument that the 
immigration judge erred. In the relatively uncommon cases in which there was more than one appeal, 
I considered only the last appeal. In modeling immigrants’ decisions to appeal, I included only cases in 
which the immigration judge, before any appeal, entered an order of removal or voluntary departure. 
Even though immigrants often waive appeal when they are granted voluntary departure, I included 
voluntary departure for two reasons. First, some immigrants may appeal the denial of a different form 
of relief when they are granted voluntary departure. Second, I wanted to capture the behavior of judges 
who encourage immigrants to accept voluntary departure early in their proceedings and therefore not 
to appeal. In modeling the government’s decision to appeal, I included only immigration judge 
decisions allowing the immigrant to stay. 
61 I am grateful to Ingrid Eagly and Steven Shafer for pointing out that a majority of 
nondetained respondents who are ordered removed without lawyers are removed in absentia—that 
is, without the respondent being present at the hearing. In order to be sure that these in absentia 
removals are not the source of these patterns on appeal, I have replicated the appeals results 
excluding all cases in which a respondent was removed in absentia at the first hearing. Excluding 
these cases actually strengthens the effect of immigration judges’ patience on appeals outcomes. 
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First, a removal order from a harsher judge makes immigrants more likely 
to file an appeal, but only if they have a lawyer. More than half of all 
immigrants with lawyers appeal if they lose before the immigration judge, 
while only 3% of immigrants without lawyers appeal.62 Moreover, immigrants 
with lawyers are sensitive to the harshness of the immigration judges, whereas 
immigrants who file appeals pro se are not. 
The left panel of Figure 2 shows a scatterplot of judges’ relief rates and the 
appeal filing rates from their decisions. When immigrants have lawyers, they 
are more likely to appeal harsh judges’ decisions. But when immigrants lack 
lawyers, they rarely appeal, regardless of how harsh their immigration judge 
was. In Figure 2, the dashed line, which shows represented immigrants, slopes 
downward: the higher the immigration judge’s relief rate, the less likely that a 
represented immigrant will appeal a removal order. By contrast, the solid line, 
which shows unrepresented immigrants, is nearly flat: the immigration judge’s 
harshness does not affect whether immigrants without lawyers decide to appeal. 
Second, as expected, the government, which always has a lawyer, more 
often appeals the relief decisions of generous judges. The line in the right 
panel of Figure 2 slopes upward, showing that the higher the immigration 
judge’s relief rate, the larger the chance that the government will appeal. 
However, government appeals are rare no matter what the immigration 
judges decide: they only appeal in about 3% of cases in which the immigration 
judge grants the respondent permission to remain in the United States. 
 















62 I categorized an immigrant as having a lawyer if a lawyer entered an appearance at  
any time during her case. 
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These patterns persist in regression models that control for differences in case 
characteristics (such as nationality and immigration charges) across judges.63 The 
generosity of the immigration judge has a large and highly significant effect on 
whether represented immigrants appeal. For each ten percentage point decrease 
in a judge’s relief rate within the same court, an immigrant with a lawyer is three 
percentage points more likely to file an appeal. The government’s filing behavior 
follows a similar pattern but in reverse: the more generous the immigration judge, 
the more likely the government is to appeal. For each ten percentage point 
increase in a judge’s relief rate, the government is less than one percentage point 
more likely to appeal.64 Still, this difference is statistically and perhaps also 
substantively significant given the low incidence of government appeal—again, 
the government appealed in only about three percent of cases during this period.  
In other words, the patterns in Figure 2 are expected, with one exception: 
immigrants without lawyers are not sensitive to the harshness of the judge 
who ordered them deported. Unrepresented immigrants rarely appeal, 
regardless of whether their immigration judge is harsh or generous. If 
unrepresented immigrants are competently representing themselves, this 
result is surprising: those who are ordered deported by a harsh judge should 
be more likely to realize that they have a chance on appeal. In practice, 
however, unrepresented immigrants may not be well informed about the legal 
merits of their cases, so perhaps it is not surprising that their likelihood of 
appeal does not reflect the harshness of the immigration judge. 
Patterns in appeal success, however, are different: immigrants appealing the 
removal order of a harsh judge are no more likely to win their appeal than those 
appealing from a relatively generous judge. This is surprising and troubling, 
and it likely reflects the fact that many of the removal orders of harsh judges 
evade scrutiny. Part IV explains this lack of scrutiny in more detail. 
When the government appeals, by contrast, the pattern is the expected 
one: the government is more likely to win an appeal from a judge with a 
higher relief rate. Figure 3 shows these results. Moving from left to right 
(from harsher to more generous judges), the government’s chance of winning 
an appeal rises sharply. Immigrants’ chances of winning appeals, by contrast, 
 
63 More details on these fixed effects regressions are provided in the Appendix, Section B, infra. 
These results are also robust to the exclusion of outliers. The results in Figure 2 persist when excluding 
(1) judges before whom represented immigrants appeal fewer than 40% of cases in the left panel, and 
(2) judges before whom the government appeals more than 10% of cases in the right panel. 
64 Whether one describes the result as statistically significant depends on whether one prefers 
Model (3) in Table 7 in the Appendix, Section C, infra. Model (3) includes immigrant 
representation, along with an interaction term for representation and judge relief rate. 
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are relatively flat. The BIA is no more likely to reverse the removal orders of 
harsh than of generous judges.65 
 
Figure 3: Asymmetrical Reversal Patterns on Appeal 
 
So far, I have shown the effects of immigration judges’ harshness 
separately for appeal filings and appeal decisions. What is their combined 
effect? In other words, how does the harshness of the immigration judge affect 
the chance that the immigrant or the government will both file an appeal and 
win reversal of the judge’s decision? 
Immigration judges’ varying generosity has no significant combined effect 
on whether immigrants appeal, but it does have an effect on whether the 
government appeals. Figure 4 shows this finding graphically. The trend line 
in the left panel of the figure for immigrants’ rate of filing and reversal is 
nearly flat. The trend line in the right panel of the figure, by contrast, slopes 
upward: the more generous the immigration judge, the higher the probability 
that the government will both file an appeal and win.66 
 
 
65 These results, too, are robust to the exclusion of outliers. For immigrant appeals, the lack of 
a pattern persists when judges with appeal win rates of below 0.01 and above 0.2 are excluded. For 
government appeals, the pattern persists when judges with appeal win rates of below 0.1 and above 
0.9 are excluded. 
66 All of these simple bivariate effects persist in regressions with control variables and  
court–year fixed effects. Consistent with the assumption that assignment of cases to judges is 
arbitrary with respect to the merits of the cases, including these variables does not substantially 
change the results, which are reported in Tables 6 to 11 in the Appendix, Section C, infra. Controlling 
for how much time immigration judges give immigrants to find a lawyer does alter the results. I 
discuss that finding in more detail in Part V, infra. 
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Figure 4: Overall Effect of Immigration Judge Generosity  
on Appeal to the BIA 
 
Overall, since government appeals make up fewer than 10% of all appeals, 
the BIA has only a marginal effect on uniformity across immigration judges.67 
In sum, the BIA is sensitive to uniformity across judges in only a small  
subset of all cases. 
B. Courts of Appeals 
The courts of appeals are no more successful than the BIA at promoting 
uniformity. This result is less surprising, however, since the courts of appeals 
defer more to the decisions of the BIA than the BIA defers to the decisions 
of immigration judges.68 Petitions for review of final removal orders69 are rare 
events, and reversal of the BIA’s decisions is even rarer. Before the 2002 
streamlining at the BIA,70 fewer than 5% of all cases resulted in a petition for 
review, and of those, fewer than 1 in 10 resulted in a remand. In other words, 
remands by a court of appeals occurred in fewer than 1 in 200 cases.71 
 
67 The government filed 4941 appeals during this period and won 1922 of them (38.9%); 
immigrants, by contrast, filed 80,225 appeals and won 5863 of them (7.3%). 
68 See supra notes 26–31 and accompanying text. 
69 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B) (2012) (defining an “order of deportation” to include removal orders 
either that have been affirmed by the BIA or for which the period for an appeal has expired). Immigrants 
may only petition for review, however, if their order of removal became final after appeal to the BIA since 
they must have exhausted all administrative remedies to obtain judicial review. Id. § 1252(d)(1). 
70 See infra Section IV.C. 
71 These numbers increased dramatically after the 2002 streamlining reforms at the BIA, but 
petitions for review are nonetheless much rarer than appeals to the BIA. I discuss that streamlining 
and its effects, infra, Section IV.C. 
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Immigration judges’ generosity has no measurable effect either on filings 
or on outcomes before courts of appeals: immigrants ordered deported by 
harsh judges are no more likely to petition for review, and once they petition, 
are no more likely to win. The rarity of both petitions for review and remands 
may help explain this effect. Moreover, in order for an immigrant to petition 
a court of appeals for review, the immigration judge’s removal order must 
have been affirmed by the BIA (or the immigration judge’s relief decision 
reversed by the BIA), perhaps making that original judge’s harshness less 
salient in the immigrant’s decision about whether to appeal once again.72 
Finally, the courts of appeals owe deference to the BIA; for many categories 
of discretionary relief, the agency’s factual determination is unreviewable.73 
These deferential standards of review may tie the hands of circuit judges, 
preventing them from promoting uniformity. 
IV. TIME, LAWYERS, AND SELECTION BIAS IN APPEALS 
Why do both the BIA and the federal courts of appeals fail to increase 
cross-judge consistency when immigrants appeal? Perhaps the lack of 
uniformity reflects the scant time and attention that the BIA and the courts 
are able to allocate to each case: many BIA decisions during this period were 
summary affirmances without legal reasoning,74 and staff attorneys at the 
courts of appeals decide many petitions for review. Yet the BIA is able to 
distinguish among cases appealed from more and less generous judges—when 
the government appeals. This might reflect a pro-government bias, but that 
explanation is also unsatisfying: although BIA members might well choose to 
reverse removal orders very rarely, one would expect them to reverse the 
removal orders of generous judges even more rarely than those of harsh judges. 
The types of cases that reach the BIA and the circuit courts suggest a 
different explanation: many of the removal orders of harsh judges 
systematically evade scrutiny because such judges enter those orders early in 
immigration proceedings, before immigrants have time to find a lawyer or to 
file an application for relief. Without a lawyer or a relief application, 
immigrants rarely appeal, and the BIA and the courts therefore rarely have 
the chance to review their removal orders, which disproportionately come 
from harsher immigration judges. 
 
72 See infra Tables 12–13. The results are generally consistent with the results at the immigration 
judge and BIA levels, but they should be interpreted with slightly more caution because the data 
may be less reliable. Since appeal dates are not reliably recorded, I cannot reliably isolate petitions 
for review that follow a particular BIA order. 
73 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2) (listing issues that are not reviewable by a court of appeals); see 
also supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text. 
74 See infra note 103 and accompanying text. 
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A. Time, Encouragement, and Access to Counsel and Relief 
Immigration judges differ dramatically in how often the immigrants 
before them file applications for relief or obtain lawyers and in the number 
of hearings those immigrants are granted before a final decision. Disparities 
across judges in relief application rates, although smaller than the final 
disparities in relief rates, span more than twenty percentage points in several 
courts.75 The average disparity in representation rates across judges is higher 
still—actually even higher than the disparity in final relief rates.76 
These findings are surprising: Immigrants, not judges, are formally in control 
of whether they find a lawyer and apply for relief. However, immigration judges 
may influence representation and relief application rates in two ways: First, they 
can provide more or less time before requiring the immigrant to move forward 
with her case.77 Second, more speculatively, immigration judges may make 
encouraging or discouraging comments in the courtroom that influence 
immigrants’ decisions about whether to proceed with their cases. 
1. Providing Time to Access Counsel 
Since the government does not provide lawyers to immigrants in removal 
proceedings,78 immigration judges themselves advise immigrants of their 
rights.79 Many immigrants—42% in the time period that this Article 
 
75 More precisely, the standard deviation of the immigration judge random effect in 
applications for relief is 7.2%, which is smaller than the level of disparity in outcomes but still 
significant. The 95% confidence interval for this standard deviation covers 6.6% to 8.1%. To count 
applications for relief, I included all cases in which the immigrant applied for at least one form of 
relief, apart from voluntary departure. See 8 U.S.C. §1229c(a) (permitting an immigrant to 
voluntarily depart the country instead of being ordered removed). Although voluntary departure is 
a form of relief, it serves a different purpose; some judges who otherwise do not strongly encourage 
relief applications might encourage applications for voluntary departure. The analysis here combines 
affirmative and defensive applications for asylum; as expected, replicating the analysis without 
including affirmative asylum applications yielded significantly higher levels of cross-judge disparity 
in applications for relief. I am grateful to Jaya Ramji-Nogales for suggesting that I try excluding 
affirmative applications as a robustness check. 
76 The standard deviation of the random effect is 10.1%, and the confidence interval  
covers 9.3%–11.4%. 
77 See infra notes 80–88 and accompanying text. 
78 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2012) (affording aliens the right to counsel in immigration 
proceedings with the costs borne by the alien); Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549, 554 (9th 
Cir. 1990) (“[A]liens have a due process right to obtain counsel of their choice at their own expense.”). 
79 Immigration proceedings are civil proceedings that take place within the EOIR, a division 
of the Department of Justice; immigration judges are appointed by the Attorney General. See 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4) (defining “immigration judge” as an attorney appointed by the Attorney General 
to serve within the EOIR); Eagly & Shafer, supra note 46, at 10-11 (describing the structure of 
American immigration courts). Although they cannot be fired without cause, they are not 
administrative law judges under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Ramji-Nogales et al. 
(2007), supra note 39, at 380, and their decisions therefore do not qualify as formal adjudications 
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considers—never find a lawyer, often because they cannot gather sufficient 
funds soon enough to employ one. At the initial master calendar hearing, 
which nearly always is a group hearing in which judges spend a few minutes 
on each case, immigration judges are required to tell immigrants that they 
have a right to a lawyer at their own expense.80 Judges must also give 
unrepresented immigrants a reasonable opportunity to find a lawyer.81 At this 
first hearing, an immigrant who lacks a lawyer can request a continuance in 
order to seek counsel.82 The judge must grant that first request for a 
continuance, but if the immigrant does not have a lawyer at the next hearing, the 
judge may either choose to grant another continuance if she finds there is “good 
cause” to do so83 or force the immigrant to represent herself.84 In practice, these 
 
under the APA, which sets out procedures and standards of judicial review for such adjudications. 
See generally 5 U.S.C. § 554 (2012). 
80 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a)(1) (2015). 
81 See id. § 1240.10(a)(2) (requiring immigration judges to advise immigrants on the availability 
of free and other legal services in the area); see also Leslie v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 611 F.3d 171, 
180 (3d Cir. 2010) (finding that a failure of an immigration judge to advise a respondent of his right 
to attorney warranted reversal even without a showing of prejudice); EXEC. OFFICE FOR 
IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL 
§ 4.15(e) (2016), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/attachments/2016/02/04/practice_
manual_-_02-08-2016_update.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q2DU-DVLU] [hereinafter IMMIGRATION 
COURT PRACTICE MANUAL] (describing the purposes of master calendar hearings, including 
advising the respondent of her right to an attorney or other representative). 
82 See IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 81, § 4.15(g) (“[T]he 
respondent may request that the Immigration Judge continue the proceedings to another master 
calendar hearing to give the respondent an opportunity to obtain representation.”). 
83 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.29, 1240.6; see also Hernandez-Gil v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 803, 807 (9th Cir. 
2007) (noting that “the [immigration judge] must inquire whether there is good cause to grant 
petitioner more time to obtain counsel” when the petitioner does not waive her right to counsel). 
84 See IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 81, § 4.15(g) (“If the 
proceedings are continued but the respondent is not represented at the next master calendar hearing 
. . . [t]he Immigration Judge may decide to proceed with pleadings at that hearing or to continue 
the matter again to allow the respondent to obtain representation.”). A more detailed explanation 
follows the basic description of rights if a lawyer is not present to waive the respondent’s right to 
that explanation. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a) (setting forth what an immigration judge must do at a 
hearing in which a respondent is not represented); IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL, 
supra note 81, § 4.15(i)(i) (noting that the respondent should be prepared “to request or waive an 
explanation of the respondent’s rights and obligations in removal proceedings”). Among other 
things, the judge must explain the contents of the Notice to Appear. Id. § 1240.10(a)(6). This 
document includes a court date and location as well as immigration charges—the reasons that the 
government believes that the immigrant is in the country illegally. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1) (2012); 
IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 81, § 4.2(a). These are formally known as 
grounds of inadmissibility (lack of permission to enter the United States) and deportability (lack of 
permission to stay in the United States). See 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2012) (listing grounds of 
inadmissibility); id. § 1227 (listing grounds of deportability). Among the most common charges are 
entry without inspection (crossing the border without authorization), overstaying the period of a 
visa, or committing a crime. See Sara Morando Lakhani, Producing Immigrant Victims’ “Right” to Legal 
Status and the Management of Legal Uncertainty, 38 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 442, 444-45 n.9 (2013) 
(listing entry without inspection and criminal acts involving moral turpitude or drugs as commonly 
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requirements leave judges wide discretion, particularly in their decisions about 
how long to allow immigrants to continue looking for a lawyer. Some judges grant 
continuances freely; others grant only one or two in each case.85 
As a result, the length of proceedings varies significantly across 
immigration judges.86 These differences are large: in some courts, the average 
length of a proceeding differs between some judges by more than two years.87 
Additional time helps immigrants in several ways. Finding a lawyer and 
applying for relief are difficult tasks, especially for nonnative English 
speakers. Some lawyers may be busy; others may be unaffordable. More time 
increases the likelihood that an immigrant will secure a lawyer. Moreover, the 
longer the continuance, the more time the immigrant has to save enough 
money to pay for a lawyer.88 
The left panel of Figure 5 shows that judges who agree to more hearings 
per case are also more likely to hear cases in which immigrants have lawyers. 
Of course, lawyers might prolong cases by more frequently requesting 
continuances. The right panel of Figure 5 addresses that concern, showing 
that the judges who decide more cases with lawyers are also more likely to 
have lawyers enter an appearance later in proceedings.89 
 
applied inadmissibility grounds); Jan Ting, Immigration Law Reform After 9/11: What Has Been Done 
and What Still Needs To Be Done, 17 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J., 503, 506 (2003) (stating that the 
most commonly applied ground for deportation is overstaying a temporary nonimmigrant visa). 
85 The denial of a continuance to seek representation may constitute a constitutional due 
process violation or a violation of the statutory right to counsel, but generally “[a]n [immigration 
judge] has wide discretion to manage his or her docket.” Al Khouri v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 461, 464 
(8th Cir. 2004). More generally, the Ninth Circuit, “[a]bsent a showing of clear abuse, typically 
do[es] not disturb an [immigration judge]’s discretionary decision not to continue a hearing,” but it 
also does not “allow a myopic insistence upon expeditiousness to render the right to counsel an 
empty formality.” Biwot v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 1094, 1099 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Ungar v. Sarafite, 
376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964)). This standard leaves courts of appeals with some discretion to decide 
whether a continuance should have been granted. As I will argue below, however, the courts of appeals 
cannot reasonably monitor the behavior of immigration judges in granting continuances, since courts 
of appeals hear a small and skewed sample of cases. See infra note 109 and accompanying text. 
86 The standard deviation of the judge–random effect is 1.1 hearings, and the 95% confidence 
interval covers 1 to 1.2 hearings. This means that judges hearing about a third of cases grant or deny 
one more or one fewer continuance than the mean. 
87 See infra Figure 5 (showing the large variance across judges in time to a lawyer’s  
entry of appearance). 
88 Recall that I do not consider detained cases; continuances in those cases raise different 
concerns, since detention is costly both to detainees and to the government. See U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-26, ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION: IMPROVED DATA 
COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS NEEDED TO BETTER ASSESS PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS 18-19 (Nov. 
2014), http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/666911.pdf [https://perma.cc/CSW8-DJ7M] (estimating that the 
average cost of detaining an immigrant is $158 per day). 
89 When a lawyer enters an appearance, the date of the entry is recorded—albeit with some 
measurement error—in the Case Access System for EOIR database (CASE). NINA SIULC ET AL., VERA 
INST. OF JUSTICE, LEGAL ORIENTATION PROGRAM: EVALUATION AND PERFORMANCE AND 
OUTCOME MEASUREMENT REPORT, PHASE II, at 74, 83-84 (May 2008), http://www.vera.org/
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If differences in the average number of hearings across judges were caused 
mostly by lawyers’ requests for continuances, we would expect the opposite 
pattern—that immigrants with lawyers who entered their appearances 
immediately would receive more hearings. In other words, lawyers tend to 
enter their appearances later before judges who allow respondents more time 
to search for a lawyer. 
 
Figure 5: Time and Representation 
 
2. Influencing Immigrants’ Litigation Strategy 
Judges may also encourage or discourage immigrants from pressing their 
cases. All judges must inform immigrants of their right to a representative at 
 
sites/default/files/resources/downloads/LOP_evalution_updated_5-20-08.pdf [https://perma.cc/EGL5-
4GM3]. The form for entry of appearance is the Form EOIR-28. Notice of Entry of Appearance as 
Attorney or Representative Before the Immigration Court, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.
gov/sites/default/files/pages/attachments/2015/07/24/eoir28.pdf [https://perma.cc/BM2S-TE79] (last 
updated Dec. 2015). The number of days between the date of the EOIR-28 and the date of the Notice 
to Appear is therefore a measure of how late in the proceeding an immigrant found a lawyer. If an 
immigrant gets a new lawyer, that lawyer must once again file an EOIR-28 form, IMMIGRATION 
COURT PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 81, § 2.2(i)(i), and the new date overrides the old one, 
SIULC ET AL., supra, at 83-84. In addition, since some lawyers refile EOIR-28 forms after their first 
appearances, in some cases this date may not reflect the initial date of appearance. Id. To be confident 
that EOIR-28 dates do not simply reflect the length of represented proceedings, and that the length of 
proceedings in fact matters on appeal, I replicated these results with new hearing-level data (obtained after 
the submission of this article) from EOIR. Using these hearing-level data to obtain an estimate of when a 
lawyer first appeared, I found that the correlation between judge representation rates and patience is 
slightly weaker—perhaps reflecting overwriting of EOIR-28 dates—but that the positive correlation 
persists, and the key results in the appeals regressions are robust to a hearing-level measure (not shown). 
Unsurprisingly, the two measures are highly correlated. 
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no government expense,90 but informal courtroom demeanor may make some 
judges more encouraging than others. Judges may also influence whether 
respondents find a lawyer in another way: by deterring lawyers from accepting 
cases in front of them. For example, lawyers in San Francisco and Los Angeles 
have said that they turn down cases assigned to some particularly harsh judges.91 
Although all immigration judges are required to inform immigrants of any 
possible relief and to give them a chance to apply for it,92 judges retain 
discretion in how they give this advice. Some judges may be more diligent than 
others in asking questions that might help them find out that an immigrant is 
eligible for relief. Moreover, some judges may be more encouraging than others 
when informing immigrants that they can apply for relief. For example, while 
observing immigration court proceedings, I saw one judge inform potential 
asylum applicants that their own testimony would count as evidence, and that 
they could proceed with their applications for relief even if they were not able 
to bring other forms of evidence. Two other judges, by contrast, simply 
informed immigrants that they had the right to present evidence but said 
nothing further, leaving some immigrants to wonder whether they had a chance 
of success without presenting witnesses or documentary evidence. 
Unrepresented immigrants also depend on judges to provide basic 
information about relief applications. For example, the asylum application 
form must be filed with the immigration court in English, and the first three 
pages must be sent to a U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services center.93 
However, when distributing the application to unrepresented immigrants, 
some judges do not mention the mailing requirement.94 When an immigrant 
appears for a hearing on the application and has failed to fulfill this 
requirement, the judge can refuse to adjudicate the application.95 A judge has 
similar discretion if parts of the application are not filled out in English. For 
 
90 IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 81, § 4.15(e). 
91 See, e.g., LAWYERS’ COMM. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS OF THE S.F. BAY AREA, RESULTS OF THE 
2014 SAN FRANCISCO IMMIGRATION JUDGE SURVEY 20 (2014) (on file with author) (“I will no 
longer take cases in front of [Judge Anthony S. Murry]. I know other lawyers who feel the  
same . . . . Murry is the perfect example of what is wrong with our immigration judicial system—if 
you draw him, you’re out of luck.”); Telephone Interview with Anonymous Immigration Attorney 
(Sept. 24, 2014) (on file with author) (explaining that her office does not accept cases in front of a 
particular judge in Los Angeles Immigration Court). 
92 IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 81, § 4.15(g). 
93 U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., I-589, 
APPLICATION FOR ASYLUM AND FOR WITHHOLDING OF REMOVAL: INSTRUCTIONS 4, 9 (2014), 
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/form/i-589instr.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZPX3-R7VK]. 
94 I observed immigration judges handing out I-589 applications without mentioning this requirement. 
95 U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., supra note 93, at 9. 
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example, in one case I observed, a judge refused to accept a completed I-589 
form because parts of the form were filled out in Spanish.96 
The same judges who allow more time for immigrants to find lawyers and 
complete their applications for relief are, on average, more likely to allow 
immigrants to remain in the country. Table 2 summarizes these relationships 
using a correlation matrix. The strongest correlations are those between judges’ 
representation rates (the percentage of cases a judge hears with lawyers), relief 
application rates, and average numbers of hearings. These strong correlations 
are expected, since relief applications and lawyers are likely both consequences 
of additional time. The correlations between these three variables and judges’ 
final relief rates are weaker by comparison, but are still strong. 
 













Relief Rate 1    
Representation Rate 0.28 1   
Relief Application Rate 0.28 0.56 1  
Average Number of Hearings 0.37 0.73 0.36 1 
 
In sum, the results demonstrate that assignment to an immigration judge 
affects not only final outcomes, but also important intermediate outcomes. 
These outcomes in turn affect which immigrants choose to appeal. 
B. Selection Effects on Appeal 
Part III revealed that the BIA’s uniformity-promoting effect exists only for 
appeals by the government, which constitute only a small fraction of all appeals, 
and that courts of appeals’ decisions do not promote cross-judge uniformity at 
all.97 These findings are easier to understand if cross-judge disparities partly 
reflect early decisions about continuances and relief applications. These early 
decisions are largely unreviewed, since immigrants who do not apply for relief 
or who do not have a lawyer very rarely appeal their deportation orders. Only 
 
96 In that case, the judge granted a six-week continuance to allow the detainee to start over and 
complete the full form in English. This, however, was a detained case, so a continuance meant a 
longer stay in immigration detention. In the quantitative analysis here, I consider only nondetained 
cases, in which continuances do not lead to detention and only defer possible removal (or relief). 
97 See supra Sections III.A, B. 
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5.9% of all appeals are from immigrants without lawyers and only 4.1% of all 
appeals are from immigrants who did not apply for relief. 
In other words, the lack of uniformity, despite appeals, reflects two 
competing forces. Although immigrants are less likely to appeal the removal 
orders of more generous judges—that is, judges who grant relief more  
often—they are more likely to appeal the decisions of judges who give them 
time to find a lawyer, even though average case length and generosity are 
correlated. Generous judges allow immigrants to find lawyers, and therefore 
to appeal if they are ordered deported. 
Because there are relatively few appeals from harsh judges, the BIA does 
not review many of the cases in which an order of removal reflected unusual 
harshness, and it therefore cannot correct errors in those cases. By contrast, 
the government only appeals when an immigrant has been granted relief (or, 
less commonly, termination).98 A generous judge’s decisions to allow more 
time are reflected in her relief decisions, and the full record goes up on appeal. 
A judge’s errors in granting relief are therefore always in the record on appeal, 
but a judge’s denial of a continuance to seek counsel rarely comes before the 
BIA because immigrants without lawyers almost never appeal. 
The data confirm this effect: as the average number of days before a lawyer 
makes a first appearance increases, the proportion of that judge’s cases that 
are appealed by immigrants likewise increases, as well as the proportion of 
cases that are ultimately reversed.99 
Regression analysis supports the same conclusions. Tables 6 and 8 in 
Appendix, Section C, provide regressions with immigrant filing decisions and 
outcomes before the BIA as the dependent variables. Table 6 shows that 
immigrants are more likely to appeal the decisions of harsher judges but are 
simultaneously more likely to appeal the decisions of judges who give them 
more time to find a lawyer, even though those judges are on average more 
generous. Table 8 shows that judges’ harshness has little effect on appeal 
outcomes, but that faster judges—those who allow more time for immigrants 
to find a lawyer—are far less likely to be reversed than slower ones. 
Finally, the same pattern persists for petitions for review. Immigrants 
whose cases were originally decided by a slower judge are more likely to file 
a petition for review and slightly more likely to win.100 
This persistent correlation—between judges’ willingness to give 
immigrants time to find lawyers and the likelihood that immigrants both 
 
98 See 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(f) (2015) (explaining termination of removal proceedings). 
99 See infra Table 1. 
100 The effect on filing behavior is much stronger than the effect on final outcomes; regressions 
with control variables suggest that there may be some small effect. Tables 10 and 11 show these 
patterns using multiple regression. 
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appeal and win reversal—helps explain why neither the BIA nor the courts of 
appeals reverse more removal orders from harsh judges: many meritorious 
cases are simply never appealed. 
C. 2002 Streamlining at the Board of Immigration Appeals 
Policy changes may also have contributed to the BIA’s failure to promote 
uniformity. After drastic streamlining at the BIA in 2002, the BIA began 
reversing the decisions of generous judges more often, regardless of whether 
the immigrant or the government appealed.101 Indeed, before this 
streamlining, the BIA did have a slight uniformity-enhancing effect for 
appeals by immigrants. However, after 2002, the BIA’s more cursory review, 
coupled with the selection problem in appeals, eliminated the effect entirely. 
The BIA’s 2002 streamlining dramatically changed its procedure for 
deciding cases.102 Most crucially, the BIA began to allow single members to 
make decisions and to issue summary affirmances—one sentence orders 
affirming the decisions of the immigration judge without any reasoning.103 
Immigration scholars and advocates have argued that these policy changes 
had important negative effects. For example, Margaret Taylor contends that the 
streamlining “greatly reduced [the BIA’s] role of promoting uniformity and 
policy consistency through precedent decisions.”104 The quantitative evidence 
suggests that Taylor was partly right: the BIA appears to have become less 
sensitive to the harshness of immigration judges when immigrants appealed 
but more sensitive to their harshness when the government appealed. Another 
way of putting this is that the BIA simply started reversing the decisions of 
generous judges more often, even when those judges had ordered an immigrant 
removed and the immigrant appealed. 
In cases appealed after March 2002, outcomes became more uniform when 
the government appealed and less uniform when immigrants appealed.105 That 
effect reflected the actions of both the BIA and of litigants. Immigrants, whose 
lawyers were no doubt aware of the BIA’s change in policy and likely noticed 
that their chances of winning some appeals had gone down, began to appeal 
harsh and generous judges’ removal orders at more similar rates. At the same 
time, as these lawyers seemed to anticipate, the BIA stopped reversing the 
 
101 See generally Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case 
Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,878 (Aug. 26, 2002) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 3). 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 54,880. The BIA initially introduced a pilot streamlining program two years before. 
For details on its rollout, see Ramji-Nogales et al. (2007), supra note 39, at 350-53. 
104 Margaret H. Taylor, Refugee Roulette in an Administrative Law Context: The Déjà Vu of 
Decisional Disparities in Agency Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 475, 489 (2007). 
105 See infra Table 14. 
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removal orders of harsher judges as frequently. The government also started 
appealing more often the relief decisions of generous judges, and began winning 
more often. In other words, lawyers for immigrants and the government noticed 
the new patterns in decisions by the BIA and changed their behavior accordingly. 
Table 14 summarizes these findings with regression results.106 
These results should be interpreted with caution: I compare appeals 
results before and after 2002, and the caseload around that time may have 
changed in ways that do not reflect the streamlining. Still, these findings offer 
some evidence that after 2002, BIA decisions less effectively promoted 
uniformity for immigrants appealing, but not for the government. Since 
immigrants appeal so much more often than the government, the net effect 
was that the BIA less effectively promoted uniformity.107 
These changes in the way the BIA treated the decisions of immigration 
judges accompanied a general trend toward fewer reversals of removal orders, 
regardless of the harshness of the immigration judge. The result was an 
enormous spike in the number of petitions for review to federal courts of 
appeals. Figure 6 shows this change. Before the streamlining, immigrants 
petitioned for review of approximately 5% of final removal orders issued by 
the BIA. After the streamlining, they petitioned for review of more than 25% 
of such orders—a 500% increase. 
 
 
106 For these estimates, I used all data from the beginning of the EOIR case database until 
cases decided by the initial immigration judge before 2007. For the rest of the Article, I used data 
for cases beginning on or after January 1, 1998. That means that the vast majority of the appeals in 
those cases occurred after 2002; only a small number of cases went up on appeal quickly enough to 
be completed before the 2002 streamlining. In this Section, by using all the data in the database, I 
was able to capture the universe of appeals decided around 2002, as well as cases not appealed in 
that time period. This requires looking at cases subject to the pre-IRIIRA regime as well as those 
subject to IRIIRA; there is no other good way of creating these estimates, which I suggest 
interpreting with caution. 
107 Disparities across immigration judges did not change significantly. 
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Figure 6: Proportion of Final BIA Removal Orders  
Resulting in Petitions for Review 
 
As the number of petitions for review grew quickly, the courts of appeals 
began more often vacating and remanding removal orders.108 Yet the 2002 
reforms had no observable effect on the courts of appeals’ sensitivity to the 
generosity of the initial immigration judge: they more often vacated the 
removal orders of both generous and harsh judges. This may reflect the fact 
that courts of appeals continued to see a biased sample of cases—those in 
which an immigrant found a lawyer before being ordered deported. It may 
also reflect the extent to which courts of appeals defer to BIA decisions. 
In sum, examining time trends around the change in BIA policy provides 
an imperfect measure of the effects of the change, but it suggests that the BIA 
became much harsher after the 2002 streamlining and, as a result, also became 
somewhat less able to promote uniformity. 
V. IMPLICATIONS 
This Article’s conclusion—that the immigration appeals process fails to 
promote uniformity because it rarely reviews removal orders issued by harsh 
judges to immigrants who lack lawyers at the beginning of their 
proceedings—has direct implications for policy and doctrine. First, the BIA 
 
108 See infra Table 15. 
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and the courts of appeals should alter their standards of review for the denial 
of a continuance. Of course, more continuances would make adjudications 
slower. I therefore suggest other reforms that could make adjudications fairer 
without slowing them. Relatively small changes in the relief application 
process—including translation of forms and simplification of practical 
requirements—could encourage immigrants to apply for relief, even without a 
lawyer. The BIA could also reduce disparities across judges by reviewing a 
random sample of cases in addition to those appealed by litigants. Last, and most 
ambitious, providing government-funded lawyers would likely not only help 
immigrants avoid removal, but would also reduce disparities across immigration 
judges and allow the BIA to supervise judges more effectively. 
Beyond the context of immigration, this Article’s findings have implications 
for administrative due process doctrine. The combination of adversarial and 
management models of case resolution in the immigration court system has 
perverse consequences, leading the BIA and the courts of appeals to consider and 
reverse a biased sample of cases. That problem is not unique to immigration cases. 
Since appellate judges hear a biased sample of cases in many areas of law, those 
judges may be unable to promote uniformity in other domains as well. 
A. Immigration Adjudications 
1. Review of Denials of Continuances 
The BIA currently fails to promote uniformity partly because it does not 
adequately review immigration judges’ decisions about continuances. A 
change in the BIA’s standard of review for the denial of a continuance would 
be a first step toward solving this problem. Currently, “an Immigration 
Judge’s discretionary decision denying a continuance will not be reversed on 
appeal unless the respondent establishes that the denial caused him actual 
prejudice and harm, and it materially affected the outcome of his case.”109 
Ironically, the harm caused by denying a continuance is partly that it prevents 
a respondent who does not have a lawyer from obtaining one and eventually 
filing an appeal of an order of removal. Since few immigrants without lawyers 
appeal the denial of a continuance, those who do appeal are, on average, those 
less disadvantaged by the denial. 
In other words, the evidence presented in this Article should lead the BIA 
to question its ability to judge whether a denial of a continuance materially 
affected the outcome of a case. Continuances affect an immigrant’s ability to 
find a lawyer and therefore to demonstrate actual prejudice on appeal. By not 
requiring a showing of actual prejudice for reversal of a continuance and instead 
 
109 Matter of Hashmi, 24 I & N. Dec. 785, 787 (B.I.A. 2009). 
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focusing on procedural aspects of the denial of a continuance, as described 
below, the BIA could better review judges’ decisions about continuances. 
Notably, this would not only lead to more generous granting of continuances 
in the first place, but would also make decisions more consistent across judges, 
since it would raise the likelihood of appellate review. 
The courts of appeals should also adopt a standard of review for the denial 
of continuances that does not require a counterfactual showing of the 
substantive importance of the continuance. In the Ninth Circuit, the 
immigration judge and the BIA are required to consider “factors including (1) 
the nature of the evidence excluded as a result of the denial of the continuance, 
(2) the reasonableness of the immigrant’s conduct, (3) the inconvenience to the 
court, and (4) the number of continuances previously granted” when deciding 
whether to grant a continuance.110 The last three factors of this standard are 
straightforward, but the first depends on an unrealistic counterfactual 
determination: the judge or the BIA may not be able to assess the nature of the 
evidence excluded as a result of the continuance if the continuance prevented 
the immigrant from entering new evidence. The same problem faces courts of 
appeals that require immigrants to show that they were prejudiced by the denial 
of a continuance in order to challenge a violation of the right to counsel.111 Once 
again, the immigrants who are able to provide compelling evidence that was 
excluded by the denial of a continuance are precisely those least harmed by that 
denial, since they eventually appealed. 
A better standard for decisions would consider only the procedural elements: 
(1) whether the immigrant acted reasonably; (2) whether the immigrant 
inconvenienced the court; and (3) how many continuances the immigrant had 
already received. The courts of appeals could easily adopt such a standard. 
Of course, a more immigrant friendly standard of review for the denial of 
continuances would have costs: more continuances mean less timely 
decisionmaking. Other compatible reforms, however, could improve timeliness 
while also reducing disparities. 
2. Practical Changes to Application for Relief Process 
Interviews and court observation suggest that many immigrants who are 
eligible for relief fail to apply for it—especially if they are assigned to a harsh 
immigration judge. A large and growing literature in behavioral economics 
has shown that small practical barriers can influence individuals’ decisions, 
 
110 An Na Peng v. Holder, 673 F.3d 1248, 1253 (9th Cir. 2012). 
111 See Montes-Lopez v. Holder, 694 F.3d 1085, 1090-92 (9th Cir. 2012) (describing a circuit 
split on the question of whether a petitioner must show prejudice in order to challenge a violation 
of the right to counsel in an immigration proceeding). 
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with surprisingly important policy consequences.112 The current 
requirements for immigration relief set up a series of unnecessary and easily 
removable practical barriers. Consider, for example, the practical steps 
necessary to apply for cancellation of removal, which is available to 
immigrants whose removal would cause “exceptional and extremely unusual 
hardship” to a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse, parent, or 
child.113 First, the eight page form must be filled out in English or must be 
accompanied by a certified English translation.114 Immigration courts provide 
oral translation during hearings115 but not written translation of relief 
applications. Second, the immigrant must pay a $100 filing fee or request a 
fee waiver from the immigration judge.116 Third, the immigrant must serve 
on Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Assistant Chief Counsel 
(1) a copy of the filled out form and all supporting documents, (2) a fee 
receipt, (3) biometric appointment information, (4) a separate Biographical 
Information Form, and (5) a photograph.117 Fourth, the immigrant must 
provide all of these documents, along with a certificate showing service of 
them on the ICE Assistant Chief Counsel, to the immigration judge.118 
These requirements are burdensome, especially for a non–English speaking 
immigrant with few resources, and they are also unnecessary. The EOIR or 
ICE could reduce the burden in several ways. First, translation services for the 
application itself would make it accessible to immigrants without lawyers. 
Translation requires resources, but the immigration courts already provide 
translation services in court; translation of applications is a natural corollary. 
Second, several of the paperwork requirements are not necessary. The 
immigration courts could share copies of applications with ICE rather than 
requiring the immigrant both to serve a copy directly and to produce proof of 
 
112 See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 8 (2008) (noting that selecting a good default option 
enlists “the gentle power of nudges”—policies that change behavior without legal coercion or 
economic incentives). 
113 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) (2012). 
114 EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, APPLICATION FOR 
CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL AND ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS FOR CERTAIN NONPERMANENT 
RESIDENTS 4, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/eoirforms/eoir42b.pdf [https://perma.cc/RD9G-FS55] 
(last updated July 2015). 
115 IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 81, § 4.11. 
116 EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, supra note 114, at 4. 
117 U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SUBMITTING CERTAIN APPLICATIONS IN IMMIGRATION COURT AND FOR 
PROVIDING BIOMETRIC AND BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION TO U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND 
IMMIGRATION SERVICES 2, http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/article/PreOrderInstr.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6ZTV-8MBP] (last updated Sept. 5, 2013). 
118 Id. 
2016] The Failure of Immigration Appeals 1211 
such service. The courts could also reduce the filing fee or make it contingent 
on the success of the application. 
Removing these practical barriers to relief applications would help 
immigrants who have meritorious claims but lack lawyers and English skills. 
Moreover, removing these barriers would promote uniformity: the 
complexity of the current requirements gives immigration judges more 
discretion about whether to accept an application for relief. Some judges may 
accept applications that come close to meeting these requirements; others 
may enforce the requirements strictly. Simplifying the requirements would 
therefore also reduce disparities across immigration judges. 
3. Review of Additional Cases 
The EOIR could also more directly amend the appeals process. A central 
shortcoming of that process is that the BIA hears a skewed sample of cases—
overwhelmingly those from immigrants with lawyers who have filed relief 
applications. The BIA could address this bias by randomly selecting additional 
cases to review.119 Such random selection is foreign to the adversarial model of 
litigation and appeals, but not to administrative appeals: for example, the Social 
Security Agency’s Appeals Council already employs random and selective 
sampling to choose cases for review.120 
The BIA could adopt a similar procedure with a special focus on the denial 
of continuances. It could randomly choose decisions on continuances—both 
denials and grants—for sua sponte review. Since these decisions typically 
follow from a short colloquy between the immigrant and the immigration 
judge, the BIA could use hearing transcripts to review many such decisions 
quickly—before the decisions exert practical effects. If the BIA were to review 
a substantial number of continuance decisions, immigration judges might begin 
to change their behavior to avoid reversal. Together with a change in the 
standard of review, such random appellate review could make immigration 
judges’ continuance decisions more consistent. 
 
119 This policy would, of course, entail arbitrary selection of some cases for additional procedural 
safeguards. If the policy succeeded in increasing consistency across immigration judges, however, that 
increased consistency would make the policy’s random access to appeal itself less important. 
120 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.969(b)(1) (2015) (“We may use random and selective sampling to 
identify cases involving any type of action (i.e., fully or partially favorable decisions, unfavorable 
decisions, or dismissals) and any type of benefits (i.e., benefits based on disability and benefits not 
based on disability). We will use selective sampling to identify cases that exhibit problematic issues 
or fact patterns that increase the likelihood of error. Neither our random sampling procedures nor 
our selective sampling procedures will identify cases based on the identity of the decisionmaker or 
the identity of the office issuing the decision.”). 
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4. Adoption of Government-Provided Counsel for Immigrants 
Finally, this Article’s findings provide additional reasons to support a 
program of government-provided counsel for immigrants. Over the past 
decade, the government has faced growing pressure, in the form of both 
litigation and advocacy, to provide lawyers for immigrants in removal 
proceedings. Immigrants’ rights groups have successfully sued for the right 
to government-provided counsel for mentally ill respondents121 and a 
nationwide class action seeking representation for children facing deportation 
is currently pending.122 Advocacy efforts have recently been successful in 
obtaining universal representation for indigent, detained immigrants in New 
York City’s immigration courts, with funding provided by private 
foundations and the New York City Council.123 
Immigrants’ rights advocates have typically argued that immigrants are 
unable to represent themselves effectively, citing descriptive statistics 
showing much higher win rates for represented than for unrepresented 
immigrants.124 For example, reports about immigration courts in New York 
City and Northern California have highlighted large disparities in 
deportation rates for detained immigrants with and without lawyers.125 
This normative case for representation reflects two related injustices: the 
injustice of deporting an immigrant who might have valid claims for relief, 
and the injustice of treating immigrants with similar potential claims 
unequally because one has a lawyer and the other does not. 
 
121 See generally Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No. CV-10-02211 DMG (DTBx), 2014 WL 5475097 
(C.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2014) (issuing a permanent injunction requiring the Attorney General to screen 
immigrants for mental illness and provide counsel to incompetent respondents). 
122 See J.E.F.M. v. Holder, 107 F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1144 (W.D. Wash. 2015) (allowing the juveniles’ 
request for classwide declaratory judgment to remain but dismissing the juveniles’ request for 
classwide injunctive relief). 
123 See Press Release, Vera Inst. of Justice, New York Becomes First Jurisdiction in Nation to 
Provide Universal Representation to Detained Immigrants Facing Deportation (June 26, 2014), 
http://www.vera.org/news/new-york-city-provide-universal-representation-detained [https://perma
.cc/WNQ2-X779] (describing the City Council’s allocation of $4.9 million “to provide universal 
representation to any indigent immigrant detained and facing deportation”). 
124 See generally, e.g., Eagly & Shafer, supra note 46. 
125 See, e.g., N. CAL. COLLABORATIVE FOR IMMIGRANT JUSTICE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR 
IMMIGRANT FAMILIES AND COMMUNITIES: STUDY OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF DETAINED 
IMMIGRANTS IN NORTHERN CALIFORNIA 18 (Oct. 2014), http://www.lccr.com/wp-content/
uploads/NCCIJ-Access-to-Justice-Report-Oct.-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/L8GJ-8ZAT] (“Detained 
individuals with lawyers were three times more likely to prevail in their removal cases than those 
without attorneys.”); Steering Comm. of the N.Y. Immigrant Representation Study Report, Accessing 
Justice: The Availability and Adequacy of Counsel in Removal Proceedings, New York Immigrant Representation 
Study Report: Part 1, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 357, 384 (2011) (“[P]eople who were represented and not 
detained at the time of case completion were . . . [a]lmost six times as likely to obtain a successful 
outcome as those . . . who were unrepresented.”). 
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This Article’s findings offer three more normative reasons to provide 
counsel to those who cannot afford it. First, immigrants face unequal 
treatment because immigration judges differ in how easy they make it for 
immigrants to find counsel.126 Second, this disparate access to counsel also 
affects immigrants’ access to the appeals process.127 Finally, judges’ influence 
on immigrants’ ability to access counsel also affects which cases immigrants 
appeal: unrepresented immigrants are unlikely to appeal no matter what, but 
immigrants with lawyers appeal more often when the judge who ordered their 
deportation is harsher than average.128 Government-provided lawyers would 
therefore increase equality in cases across judges, most immediately by 
equalizing the rate at which immigrants are represented, and, as a result, 
equalizing access to appeals. 
This policy proposal, like the proposed simplification of the relief 
application process, has an additional advantage: removal proceedings need 
not be delayed so that an immigrant can search for a lawyer. The denial of 
continuances is normatively troubling because it prevents immigrants from 
finding a lawyer and building their case, not because it shortens cases. In fact, 
timeliness in adjudications is a due process value. Granting continuances is 
not a natural way of increasing the rate of representation. The government 
could increase that rate directly by providing lawyers and could 
simultaneously take measures to reduce the length of proceedings. This 
conclusion is consistent with (though not as strong as) the conclusions of a 
report authored by economic expert John Montgomery for the New York City 
Bar Association, which found that a program of government-provided 
representation could pay for itself, partly by reducing the number of 
continuances requested by immigrants.129 
In sum, this Article’s empirical findings provide support for several 
straightforward doctrinal and policy changes, along with a new normative rationale 
for the government to provide lawyers to immigrants in removal proceedings. 
 
126 See supra subsection IV.A.1. 
127 See supra Section IV.B. 
128 See supra Figure 2. 
129 See DR. JOHN D. MONTGOMERY, NERA ECON. CONSULTING, COST OF COUNSEL IN 
IMMIGRATION: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPOSAL PROVIDING PUBLIC COUNSEL TO 
INDIGENT PERSONS SUBJECT TO IMMIGRATION REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS 3 (2014), 
http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/archive2/NERA_Immigration_Report_5.28.2
014.pdf [https://perma.cc/PHW6-VWK8] (contending that savings from reduced detention costs, 
legal orientation programs, transportation, and foster care would pay for most of the publicly funded 
counsel); see also supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
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B. Administrative Due Process 
These results and policy recommendations also contribute to a larger 
debate over how to protect due process rights in administrative adjudications. 
Administrative due process doctrine relies explicitly on the empirical 
assumption that adversarial procedures increase the accuracy of 
administrative hearings. In Goldberg v. Kelly, the Supreme Court found a 
constitutional right to a hearing before termination of welfare benefits, 
holding that such a hearing would further both the government’s and the 
claimant’s interest in an accurate eligibility decision.130 Although the Court 
has subsequently narrowed the Goldberg holding, this rationale for due process 
requirements persists. Mathews v. Eldridge established the contemporary 
procedural due process balancing test: to determine whether hearing 
procedures are constitutionally adequate, the Court considers (1) the 
importance of the private interest at issue, (2) the risk of error in the current 
procedure and the likely value of additional or alternative procedures, and (3) 
the government’s interest in minimizing costs.131 
The second Mathews factor typically requires courts to estimate the value of 
additional procedures. When reviewing decisions by immigration judges and the 
BIA, courts of appeals must not only decide whether a specific procedural 
safeguard increases the risk of error, but also whether the lack of that safeguard 
actually caused prejudice in the case before them.132 
Measuring the error-reduction benefit of additional procedures is a difficult 
empirical task, which in practice leaves judges guessing. Still more worrying is that 
procedural deficiencies can systematically prevent appeals courts from hearing 
cases that are representative of the overall case pool. This Article has offered an 
example of this dynamic in immigration adjudications: denials of continuances not 
only prevent immigrants from raising substantive claims but also prevent them 
from appealing those denials by limiting their access to counsel. 
The problem, however, is a more general one. Immigration adjudications 
combine inquisitorial and adversarial procedures. In an unrepresented removal 
hearing before an immigration judge, the procedure is largely inquisitorial.133 
 
130 See 397 U.S. 254, 266 (1970) (finding that, because hearings serve the goal of reaching 
correct results, “the interest of the eligible recipient in uninterrupted receipt of public assistance, 
coupled with the State’s interest that his payments not be erroneously terminated, clearly outweighs 
the State’s competing concern to prevent any increase in its fiscal or administrative burdens”). 
131 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
132 See, e.g., United States v. Nicholas-Armenta, 763 F.2d 1089, 1091 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding 
that mass deportation hearings do not necessarily violate the Due Process Clause and that a group 
hearing did not cause prejudice to the petitioner). 
133 See Fatma E. Marouf, Implicit Bias and Immigration Courts, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 417, 430 
(2011) (“The Immigration and Nationality Act allows [immigration judges] to interrogate, examine, 
and cross-examine witnesses.”). 
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The immigration judge must provide the immigrant with information about 
the charges against her as well as possible forms of relief, and must advise the 
immigrant that she is entitled to be represented by counsel.134 
If, however, the immigration judge fails to fulfill these inquisitorial 
responsibilities, an immigrant may seek relief through an appeal to the BIA. 
Yet that appeals process, although theoretically available to unrepresented 
immigrants, is in practice an adversarial procedure used almost exclusively by 
immigrants with lawyers.135 Immigration adjudications occupy a middle 
ground between administrative social welfare adjudications and criminal 
trials. Immigration courts employ procedures similar to those used to 
apportion social welfare benefits, such as social security disability insurance, 
but the penalty—banishment—more closely resembles a criminal sanction 
than denial of access to a welfare benefit. 
Which set of procedural protections is appropriate? I do not attempt to resolve 
this question in my policy recommendations. Instead, I have proposed specific 
policy changes that draw on both criminal and administrative procedures. 
Government-provided counsel would make immigration courts look more like 
state criminal courts, but random selection of continuance decisions for review on 
appeal would make immigration adjudications look more like Social Security 
disability appeals. Both would make outcomes more consistent across judges. 
More conceptually, the immigration appeals process faces problems 
similar to those identified forty years ago by Jerry Mashaw in his work on the 
concept of due process as a management problem.136 Mashaw argued that the 
purposes and nature of claims in social welfare adjudication systems render 
procedural and appeallate safeguards ineffective.137 Mashaw’s response to this 
conundrum was to reframe due process concerns in social welfare decisions 
as a management problem.138 Government agencies could ensure accuracy, 
fairness, and timeliness in adjudications by adopting nonadversarial 
procedural safeguards.139 Specifically, Mashaw advocated the adoption of 
quality assurance systems—nonadversarial accuracy checks.140 
 
134 See supra notes 78–82 and accompanying text. 
135 See supra Figure 2. 
136 See generally JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY 
DISABILITY CLAIMS (1983); Jerry L. Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process: Some Theoretical and 
Litigation Notes on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness, and Timeliness in the Adjudication of Social Welfare 
Claims, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 772 (1974) [hereinafter Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process]. 
137 See Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process, supra note 136, at 804 (“[T]he provision of 
formal procedural safeguards and appeal rights is inadequate in some contexts unless bolstered by a 
sound internal quality assurance program.”). 
138 Id. at 775-76. 
139 Id. 
140 See generally id. 
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That suggestion is very similar to my proposal that the BIA randomly 
select continuance decisions for review on appeal. In fact, the Social Security 
Agency uses its Appeals Council—the analogue to the BIA—to randomly 
evaluate cases, in a variation on a quality assurance system.141 The random 
selection procedure proposed here is therefore a simple form of a quality 
assurance system—an appeals procedure without litigant selection. 
A quality assurance system would address the problem of selection bias in 
appeals—the fact that some litigants are more likely to appeal, regardless of the 
merits of their case. That problem is particularly severe in immigration court, 
where many litigants lack the resources to appeal, but the same problem 
necessarily exists in other mass adjudication contexts, raising similar research 
questions. Which Social Security disability and National Labor Relations 
Board cases, for example, are most likely to reach the courts? And how does 
that sample affect courts’ ability to promote uniformity? I hope that this Article 
serves partly as a call for empirical research to begin answering these questions. 
CONCLUSION 
Many normative theories of appeal rely on appellate bodies’ ability to 
create uniform outcomes. The immigration appeals process fails to promote 
at least one type of uniformity: smaller cross-judge disparities. This failure 
reflects the structure of initial immigration adjudications. Harsh immigration 
judges’ removal orders are systematically less likely to be appealed. 
Courts and scholars of administrative and immigration law have long 
debated whether agencies should take steps to limit the discretion of 
administrative judges and thereby reduce disparities.142 That controversy has 
centered on whether agency heads should be able to limit the discretion that 
judges exercise when they grant relief or issue a removal order.143 This Article 
shows that immigration judges make disparate decisions long before they 
exercise their discretion over relief claims: some are more likely to grant 
continuances than others, and are therefore more likely to allow immigrants to 
find a lawyer and apply for relief. Moreover, these disparities in early decisions 
help explain why the BIA and the courts of appeals are no more likely to reverse 
the deportation orders of harsh judges than those of generous judges: harsh 
 
141 20 C.F.R. § 404.969(b)(1) (2015). 
142 See, e.g., Nash v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 675, 681 (2d Cir. 1989) (denying Social Security administrative 
law judge’s claim that agency policies intended to reduce disparities violated their right to decisional 
independence under the Administrative Procedure Act); Taylor, supra note 104, at 490-95 (providing an 
overview of the controversy over decisional independence for Social Security administrative law judges). 
143 See Taylor, supra note 104, at 481 (describing the “obvious tension” between increased 
oversight and the “decisional independence of agency adjudicators” that has “bedeviled 
administrative law from its inception”). 
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judges partly reach their results by preventing an individual relief hearing with 
a lawyer, rather than by denying relief to immigrants who make it that far. 
These two related empirical findings suggest policy prescriptions. It may 
be possible to reduce disparities without limiting judges’ discretion, even over 
whether to grant continuances. Since continuances likely affect outcomes by 
helping immigrants apply for relief and find lawyers, providing immigrants 
with lawyers should reduce disparities. Providing lawyers to immigrants is 
already a priority for the immigrants’ rights movement;144 this Article simply 
provides an additional rationale for reform. Short of such dramatic reform, this 
Article proposes small, targeted policy changes: changing the standard of 
review for the denial of a continuances, making relief applications easier to 
file, and providing randomized review of immigration judges’ continuance 
decisions. These small changes would begin to fix the immigration appeals 
process, taking a step toward fairer results in immigration court. 
  
 
144 See, e.g., STUDY GROUP ON IMMIGRANT REPRESENTATION, NEW YORK IMMIGRANT 
REPRESENTATION STUDY, ACCESSING JUSTICE: THE AVAILABILITY AND ADEQUACY OF COUNSEL 
IN IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS 38 (2011), https://www.ils.ny.gov/files/Accessing%20Justice.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7EUR-6GZ8] (advocating “intense and widespread commitment across stakeholders” 
to address the “enormous scale” of the access-to-counsel problem); see also supra subsection V.A.4. 
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APPENDIX 
A. Case Assignment 
To study the effect of judges’ differing generosity, one would ideally 
assign cases randomly to judges. Although previous studies of cross-judge 
disparities have asserted that assignment to judges is random in practice,145 I 
find that assignment is not random and consider the likely causes of the 
nonrandomness. Relying on interviews with lawyers and court personnel, 
evidence of case clustering, and the replication of results within a subset of 
the data in which assignment appears random, I argue that case assignment 
is arbitrary with respect to the merits of cases. 
Previous work on disparities across immigration judges has relied on the 
immigration courts’ own assertion that cases are randomly assigned to judges.146 
Ramji-Nogales et al. also rely on these assertions as evidence of random 
assignment across asylum cases within the same immigration court and detention 
calendar, but they do not test the assertions.147 These assertions are inaccurate in 
two important respects. First, the subset of cases in which an immigrant has filed 
an asylum application is far from random. As I show below, the filing of a relief 
application is itself an important result of judge assignment. Filing an I-589 form 
in English is a difficult administrative task for some unrepresented immigrants, 
and a judge can make immigrants aware of the possible relief and encourage them 
to apply for it.148 A judge can also be more or less generous in granting 
continuances to allow an immigrant to gather evidence and complete the 
application.149 A full analysis of asylum disparities therefore should consider both 
asylum filing rates and asylum success rates.150 
Second, assignment is not random, although I find that deviations from 
random assignment are small and not highly correlated with the merits of the 
 
145 See, e.g., Ramji-Nogales et al. (2007), supra note 39, at 332 (noting that “nearly all [asylum] 
cases are assigned randomly to the judges”). 
146 See, e.g., id. at 326 n.52 (citing, without questioning, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, CASELOAD PERFORMANCE REPORTING 
NEEDS IMPROVEMENT 17 (2006), for the proposition that immigration cases are largely assigned 
through an automated system, with narrow exceptions for unaccompanied juvenile cases, cases that 
were previously assigned a judge in the same immigration court, and judges with heavy caseloads). 
147 See generally Ramji-Nogales et al. (2007), supra note 39. The authors also address possible 
differences in caseload by looking at one nationality at a time. This strategy reduces the likelihood of 
bias, but it does not solve the problem that relief application rates vary across judges as well. In addition, 
looking at one nationality at a time reduces the number of cases heard by each judge and raises the 
chances that disparities reflect statistical noise rather than judges’ attitudes. To avoid this risk, I use a 
measure of disparity that explicitly accounts for such random variation with a confidence interval. 
148 See supra notes 93–96 and accompanying text. 
149 See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
150 Addressing these issues requires data on all forms of relief, which were not available to 
Ramji-Nogales et al., but are recorded in the full EOIR database used here. 
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cases. In assessing cross-judge disparities, the key danger is that some judges 
hear more meritorious cases than do others. If court administrators assign 
different judges easier or harder cases, then different rates of relief would 
reflect differences in caseload rather than in the actions of immigration 
judges. Alternately, if lawyers strategically direct their cases to particular 
judges, relief rates might reflect lawyers’ actions. 
In qualitative research on the assignment process, however, lawyers 
unanimously said that they were unable to affect which judge heard their cases 
and that they had not noticed systematic differences in types of cases across 
judges.151 They believed that assignment was random within groups of 
detained and nondetained immigrants at the same court. 
These impressions from lawyers do not fully hold up in the data, however. To 
check for random assignment of cases to judges, I conducted balance tests below. 
If assignment is random, the proportions of each judge’s cases from common 
nationalities and with certain immigration charges should be approximately equal 
within the same court. There are statistically significant differences across 
judges in nearly all courts during most of the period of study. 
What might cause these differences across judges? No one I spoke with 
suspected deliberate manipulation of the process. For example, a former law 
clerk at one of the largest immigration courts was certain that the volume of 
cases and the difficulty of scheduling them all would prevent the 
administrative staff from implementing a deliberate assignment scheme. 
In the absence of a deliberate scheme, what might lead to nonrandom 
patterns in case assignment? First, people are notoriously bad at 
implementing random assignment; when asked to choose numbers randomly 
 
151 I spoke with attorneys and court personnel in Eloy, Arizona; Florence, Arizona; Los Angeles, 
California; San Francisco, California; New Orleans, Louisiana; Oakdale, Louisiana; and New York, 
New York. Note that this analysis excludes all detained cases, even the cases of those who were quickly 
released. Although assignment appears to be arbitrary within courts and nondetained/detained 
calendars, assignment is not arbitrary across detained and nondetained cases within each immigration 
court. For example, in the San Francisco immigration court, four judges routinely handle detained 
cases. Comparing the relief rates of those judges to the relief rates of colleagues who hear 
overwhelmingly nondetained cases would be deceptive, since relief rates for detained cases are lower 
on average. Isolating asylum cases would not solve this problem. Detained immigrants may have more 
reason than nondetained immigrants to apply for asylum; other forms of relief may be unavailable. 
More broadly, the Department of Homeland Security exercises discretion when it chooses whom to 
detain, and it may choose to detain immigrants whose cases inspire less (or more) sympathy than those 
whom it releases. Controlling for observable differences between detained and nondetained 
immigrants cannot solve this problem without the extremely strong assumption that detained and 
nondetained populations are similar in all the unmeasured ways that matter. For example, the EOIR 
data do not include socioeconomic information about immigrants. A model controlling for only the 
available variables must assume that these are the only ones that matter. 
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in an experimental setting, they often fail.152 If administrators are asked to 
distribute cases randomly to judges, they may fail even if they make good 
faith attempts to do so. A seemingly random method—such as distributing 
cases by the last name of the immigrant—could lead some nationalities to be 
overrepresented or underrepresented. Other seemingly random methods 
might encounter similar pitfalls. For example, immigrants’ Alien Numbers, 
which are used to identify their cases in immigration court, have some distinct 
patterns. Alien Numbers beginning with certain digits are associated with the 
immigration amnesty of the 1980s, for example.153 Since those immigrants were 
able to obtain green cards, they would only find themselves in immigration court 
after committing a crime. So an assignment scheme that relied on Alien Numbers 
might send a disproportionate number of criminal cases to certain judges. 
Moreover, the process by which cases enter the immigration courts is itself not 
random, and that nonrandomness may affect case assignment. For example, many 
cases reach immigration court after workplace sweeps, and all the cases from a 
sweep may be assigned to one or a few judges.154 Nonrandom patterns in workplace 
raids may therefore lead to nonrandom patterns in case type across judges. 
None of these deviations from random assignment are directly observable 
in the data, but the data show that cases arrive in clusters, perhaps as a result of 
raids or arrests near the border. Figure 7 shows the number of immigrants 
charged with “entry without inspection”—a common immigration charge—by 
week over the period of study in the largest four immigration courts. The graph 
shows large week-to-week deviations in each court; cases of entry without 
inspection arrive in clusters. If cases are assigned to judges in rotation, then this 
clustering could contribute to the lack of random assignment. 
 
 
152 See James E. Mosimann et al., Data Fabrication: Can People Generate Random Digits?, 4 
ACCOUNTABILITY RES. 31, 45 (1995) (finding that experimental subjects often failed to generate a 
uniform distribution of digits when asked to choose numbers randomly). 
153 This is based on interviews with immigration court clerks. 
154 See Telephone Interview with a Los Angeles Immigration Attorney (Sept. 24, 2014) (on file 
with author) (“There was a big raid that we dealt with four or five years ago and we ended up getting 
the same three judges on it.”). 
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Figure 7: Clustering in Immigration Cases 
 
Even where significance tests reject the null hypothesis that case assignment 
is independent of judges, however, deviations from random assignment may be 
arbitrary with respect to the outcomes that matter—here, judges’ decisions. 
I began by checking balance on covariates. To check balance, I needed to 
identify case characteristics that are set prior to assignment to a judge, and 
that the judge cannot affect. Finding these characteristics requires attention 
to the practical course of a removal proceeding in immigration court. 
First, the initial charges are determined before the judge hears a case. 
With some exceptions, an immigration proceeding begins with a Notice to 
Appear, issued by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).155 EOIR 
records the immigration charges on the Notice to Appear in the CASE 
database at the outset of the proceeding. The charges recorded in the database 
generally do not change, even if DHS later drops or adds charges.156 
 
155 See supra note 84. No Notice to Appear is issued when an immigrant is subject to expedited 
removal, a procedure that bypasses immigration court unless the immigrant argues that she has a 
reasonable fear of persecution upon deportation and is therefore eligible for withholding of removal. In 
these cases, the reasonable fear issue is referred to immigration court, but no Notice to Appear is issued. 
156 This makes the charge information in the database less reliable as a record of the final 
charges in a case, but it also means that different charges should be randomly distributed across 
judges if case assignment is random. 
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Similarly, immigrants’ personal traits precede judge assignment. The 
most obviously salient trait in immigration court is nationality, since nation 
of origin can directly affect the merits of immigration cases. Gender and age 
might, however, be important in less direct ways. Unfortunately, EOIR only 
began recording gender and age a few years ago; many of the cases with 
gender and age information are not yet completed. 
These are, unfortunately, the only covariates in the CASE database that are 
definitively determined before the first hearing. Judges can subtly affect several 
other case characteristics that might otherwise be set before hearings. For 
example, the database includes the language of the hearings, and immigrants 
who are fluent in both English and another language may choose which language 
to use. Judges can affect this choice by urging immigrants more or less strongly 
to use an interpreter. Judges may also affect the likelihood that immigrants find 
lawyers and apply for relief, as I argue in the body of the Article.157 
As a summary balance check, I performed chi-squared tests for 
independence between these four proportions and judge assignment within 
each immigration court for every three-month period between January 1, 
1998, and August 31, 2004. If assignments were random, we would expect 95% 
of the resulting p-values to be greater than 0.05. Table 3 below shows that this 
is not the case. Assignment is very unlikely to have been fully random. 
 
 
157 See supra subsection IV.A.2. 
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Table 3: Proportion of Three-Month Periods in Which Cross-Judge 









Arlington 19% 44% 26% 96% 
Atlanta 70 63 74 85 
Baltimore 74 52 33 96 
Boston 59 41 41 78 
Buffalo 81 89 100 100 
Chicago 30 37 63 85 
Dallas 59 63 78 93 
Detroit 52 59 78 85 
Harlingen 48 89 52 96 
Houston 44 63 33 89 
Los Angeles 0 0 22 15 
Miami 41 0 7 78 
New York City 44 30 41 15 
Newark 67 44 67 78 
Orlando 56 56 81 89 
Philadelphia 33 41 52 74 
San Antonio 44 41 30 96 
San Diego 67 67 96 100 
San Francisco 4 15 44 74 
 
Because assignment does not appear to be random, I went on to test, first, 
whether controlling for observable differences significantly alters my estimates 
of relief rates. Second, I tested whether the results hold for a subsample of 
courts and time periods in which assignment may have been random. 
To control for observable differences, I estimated a regression with year 
and court fixed effects and judge random effects.158 In order to satisfy the 
assumptions of the random effects model, judge effects should be 
approximately normally distributed. To check whether this assumption is 
plausible, I plot the actual distribution of judge relief rates below and overlay 
a normal distribution with the same standard deviation. 
 
 
158 In choosing a random effects model to measure cross-judge disparities, I follow  
Yang, supra note 1. 
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Figure 8: Distribution of Relief Rates 
I therefore fit a model of the form 
 
Yijct = Xijct 	 + 	 	 + 	 	 + 	c * 	 	 + 	ijct 
 
where vijct = μjct + εijct 
 
Yijct is binary outcome159 for immigration case i before immigration judge j 
in immigration court c in year t, and Xijct is a vector of control variables.160 
Immigration court fixed effects ( 	 	) and year fixed effects ( 	 	) are included. 
μjct is the judge mean, estimated in a random effects specification, and εijct is 
an individual-level error term. The standard deviation of interest is the 
standard deviation of μjct. 
I used this model to assess whether nonrandom assignment is substantively 
important, checking whether controlling for these deviations significantly 
 
159 This variable is 0 if a case ends with deportation and 1 if it does not. I code cases as not 
leading to deportation if the recorded outcome was any of the following: “Alien Maintains Legal 
Status”; “Case Terminated by IJ”; “Conditional Grant”; “Granted”; “Relief or Rescinded”; or 
“Legally Admitted.” I code cases as leading to deportation if the outcome was any of: “Remove”; 
“Voluntary Departure”; “Excluded”; or “Deported.” 
160 These are (1) the number of charges per immigrant, (2) an indicator for whether the 
immigrant is Mexican, (3) an indicator for whether the immigrant is Central American, (4) an 
indicator for whether the immigrant is charged with a crime-related ground for removal, and  
(5) whether the immigrant is charged with entry without inspection. 
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changes estimates of judges’ relief rates. Figure 8 compares simple centered 
relief rates to rates estimated from a random effects regression with controls. 
The two distributions look relatively similar, and the simple rates actually vary 
slightly less than the rates with controls—the opposite of what one would 
expect if the assignment process were causing the cross-judge disparities. 
 
Figure 9: Judge Relief Rates With vs. Without  
Nationality and Charge Controls 
 
Of course, the similarity of the densities might be deceptive—individual 
judge relief rates might be affected by the control variables, even if the spread 
remains similar. I therefore checked the correlation between the random 
effects coefficients and the simple means. It is 0.97, suggesting that 
controlling for observable differences has only a small effect. 
B. Subsample 
In order to identify time periods and courts in which assignment of cases 
to judges was likely to be random, I began with the full EOIR data set of 
nondetained cases, rather than only the cases initiated between 1998 and 
2004. I then narrowed the data set to courts that had heard at least 8000 cases 
in order to work only with courts that might yield large enough samples 
within each period. Next, I divided the data into three month periods, and 
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for each three month period in each court, I performed Chi-squared tests for 
independence across judges for each of the four variables mentioned earlier: 
(1) proportion Mexican immigrants; (2) proportion Central American 
immigrants; (3) proportion of immigrants facing crime-related immigration 
charges; and (4) proportion of immigrants facing the charge of entry without 
inspection. After conducting these tests, I narrowed the sample to courts and 
time periods in which the p-value from none of the four Chi-squared tests 
was below 0.1. I then eliminated courts and time periods in which there were 
fewer than two judges who decided at least fifty cases. This yielded a set of 
123,454 cases from twenty-nine courts initiated between 1997 and 2013. 
Notably, these criteria excluded two of the four largest courts—Los Angeles 
and Miami—from the analysis entirely. 
I then estimated the same random effects model as in the analysis above 
with court-period fixed effects and judge random effects. 
 
Table 4: Subsample Judge Standard Deviations 
 
Dependent Variable SD Point Estimate
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Deportation 6.4% 6.1–7.9% 
Representation 4.7 4.3–5.6 
Relief Application 5.2 4.7–6.1 
 
The effects are significantly smaller than those reported for the full 
analysis, but they are also for a different set of courts. I therefore compared 
estimates for six courts for which there are many observations from both 
samples.161 The results from the subsample and full sample are relatively 
similar, with a few exceptions. The differences in Atlanta stand out especially. 
This may reflect the different sample periods—in Atlanta, half of the cases in 




161 These are the six courts with the most observations from the subsample in which random 
assignment is plausible and which are also in the larger nineteen-court sample. 
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Table 5: Subsample and Full Sample Point Estimates 
 








Atlanta 0% 10.1% 3.1% 14.3% 5.0% 12.7% 
Baltimore 7.2 8.1 5.2 2.9 9.6 9.3 
Boston 9.9 11.4 0 0 2.7 2.6 
Buffalo 2.1 2.1 7.6 4.7 8.5 3.0 
Harlingen 11.5 6.0 1.1 0.5 1.3 1.7 
Newark 4.7 3.6 6.3 2.6 3.2 3.3 
 
Overall, the substantive similarity of the results suggests that the 
observational approach adopted in the bulk of this Article returned estimates 
that are not systematically biased. However, the differences do encourage 
caution in interpreting the point estimates. The claims that I make do not 
depend, however, on a precise interpretation of these estimates. 
C. Appeals Regressions 
To assess the effect of judge relief rates on appeal filings and success, I 
used the following linear probability model: 
 
Yijct= ß0 + ß1Xict + ß2Jct + ß3Rict + ß4(Rijct*Jct)  + Γct + eict 
where J is the immigration judge’s unweighted relief rate for c immigration 
courts and t years, R is an indicator variable for whether an immigrant i is 
represented, X is a vector of control variables,162 and  represents fixed effects 
for courts and years.163 Standard errors are clustered on the immigration 
judge. I estimate this model separately for appeals initiated by immigrants 
and by the government, for two dependent variables: whether an appeal was 
filed; and whether, given a filed appeal, the appellant won remand or 
reversal.164 For each model, I interpret the effect of the judge relief rate as 
causal because, as I have argued, judge relief rates are arbitrarily assigned.165 
I do not, however, interpret the effect of representation as causal: the difference 
 
162 These include the number of charges, along with indicators for whether a charge is related 
to crime or entry without inspection, as well as indicators for whether an immigrant is Mexican or 
from a Central American country. Most importantly, I also controlled for each judge’s average 
number of days elapsed before immigrants find lawyers. 
163 The year is measured as of the date of the Notice to Appear. 
164 See infra Tables 6–11. 
165 See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
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in appeal rates could reflect differences in the merits of the cases or in the 
sophistication of the immigrants rather than the effect of a lawyer. 
I use nearly identical regression models to measure the effect of generosity 
on petition for review to courts of appeals, but I condition these results on 
losing before the BIA. The results should be treated with caution: because the 
petition for review data only occasionally provide a filing date, there is no 
reliable way to match petitions for review to BIA decisions. For example, if an 
immigrant appeals to the BIA, has her appeal denied, but then wins on petition 
for review in a court of appeals and has the case remanded to the immigration 
judge but loses again, appeals again to the BIA, and then wins before the BIA, 
that case is excluded, since I included only cases in which the most recent BIA 
decision was a deportation decision. Despite these concerns, the substantive 
results largely match those at the BIA level. 
Below are ten regression tables. The first six (Tables 6–11) summarize 
patterns in appeals filings and outcomes when immigrants appeal and when the 
government appeals. The next two (Tables 12–13) display patterns in filing and 
outcomes on petition for review, and the final two (Tables 14–15) show the effects 
of streamlining on patterns in appeals to the BIA and petitions for review. 
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Table 6: Dependent Variable: Immigrant Files Appeal  
(if Ordered Removed) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     










     
Number of Charges on 










     




























     

















     























N 261,350 261,350 261,350 261,350 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Models include year and court fixed effects 
Standard errors clustered on immigration judge 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 7: Dependent Variable: ICE Files Appeal  
(if Immigrant Avoids Deportation) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 











     









































     

















     























N 145,803 145,803 145,803 145,803 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Models include year and court fixed effects 
Standard errors clustered on immigration judge 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 8: Dependent Variable: Alien Wins Appeal (if Filed) 












     









































     









































N 78,518 78,518 78,518 78,518 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Models include year and court fixed effects 
Standard errors clustered on immigration judge 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 9: Dependent Variable: ICE Wins Appeal (if Filed) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 











     









































     









































N 4736 4736 4736 4736 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Models include year and court fixed effects 
Standard errors clustered on immigration judge 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 10: Dependent Variable = 1 if Alien Files and Wins Appeal 












     









































     









































N 261,350 261,350 261,350 261,350 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Models include year and court fixed effects 
Standard errors clustered on immigration judge 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 11: Dependent Variable = 1 if ICE Files and Wins Appeal 












     









































     









































N 145,803 145,803 145,803 145,803 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Models include year and court fixed effects 
Standard errors clustered on immigration judge 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 12: Dependent Variable: Immigrant Files Petition for Review 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 











     









































     









































N 75,366 75,366 75,366 75,366 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Models include year and court fixed effects 
Standard errors clustered on immigration judge 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 13: Dependent Variable: Immigrant Wins  
Remand on Petition for Review 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 











     









































     









































N 20,572 20,572 20,572 20,572 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Models include year and court fixed effects 
Standard errors clustered on immigration judge 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 14: Effects of Streamlining on Appeals to the BIA 






Files & Wins 
Government 
Files & Wins 










     
Demeaned Judge Average 










     










     
Crime-Related Charge 0.021** -0.00057 0.0061*** 0.00097 
 (0.0071) (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.00060) 











     
Mexican -0.10*** 0.0019 -0.024*** 0.0021*** 
 (0.0088) (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.00063) 
     
Central American -0.10*** -0.011*** -0.025*** 0.000011 
 (0.0071) (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.00044) 























N 573,745 311,007 573,745 311,007 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Models include year–court fixed effects 
Standard errors clustered on immigration judge 
Post-Streamlining means immigration judge decisions after March 1, 2002 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 15: Effects of Streamlining on Petitions for Review 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Immigrant 
Petitions 
Immigrant Wins Immigrant Petitions 
& Wins 
Demeaned Judge Relief Rate 0.026 0.080 0.0045 
 (0.022) (0.045) (0.0037) 
    
Demeaned Judge Average 
Time Before Lawyer 
Appearance 
0.000089*** 0.00010** 0.000024** 
(0.000014) (0.000036) (0.0000075) 
   
    
Number of Charges on NTA 0.011*** -0.0017 0.00052 
 (0.0021) (0.0025) (0.00054) 
    
Crime-Related Charge 0.0055 0.016* 0.0021 
 (0.0048) (0.0072) (0.0011) 
    
Entered Without Inspection 0.0053 0.0081 0.0018 
 (0.0041) (0.0044) (0.0011) 
    
Mexican -0.10*** -0.034*** -0.011*** 
 (0.0069) (0.0072) (0.0016) 
    
Central American -0.059*** -0.023*** -0.0059*** 
 (0.0054) (0.0056) (0.00082) 
    
Indicator for Post-
Streamlining Decision 
0.17*** 0.064*** 0.017*** 
(0.0097) (0.012) (0.0018) 
    
Post-Streamlining* Judge 
Relief Rate 
-0.058 -0.090 -0.0073 
(0.037) (0.063) (0.016) 
    
N 189,000 37,386 189,000 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Models include year–court fixed effects 
Standard errors clustered on immigration judge 
Post-Streamlining means BIA decisions after March 1, 2002 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
